JOINT ARAB WORK AS A PRIORITY IN ARAB LEAGUE'S ACTIONS

FAILURE AND SUCCESS (1990-2010)

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Dedication

TO MY MOTHER WHERE EVER SHE IS.

TO JORDAN

TO ARAB UNITY

Acknowledgement

I would like to present my sincere thanks and gratitude to my mentor Dr. Omar Al Hadrami who provided the continuous help whenever I needed it, and to Mr. Abdallah Al-Madadhah for sharing with me his rich experience in dealing with Arab Affairs with no limits.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

LAS : LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

JAW : JOINT ARAB WORK

OAS : ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES

OAU : ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

UN : UNITED NATIONS

NATO : NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

SEATO : SOUTHEAST ASIAN TREATY ORGANISATION

GCC : GULF COOPERATION COUNTRIES

UAR : UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

LIST OF APPENDICES

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks for analyzing and identifying the current performance of the first regional organization in the Arab Region, As well as proving some insight into the reasons and factors behind such performance by using three approaches as a methodology of evaluation.

A more nuanced assessment of the contributions of the institutional bodies of the Arab League to regional management was another aim from this study, thus providing a more precise basis not only for assessing real achievements of regional and sub-regional institutional frameworks in the Middle East, but also for orienting the process of internal reform that such organization urgently need to undertake in order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in launching joint initiatives.

In order to reach the aims and purposes of this study that posed some serious questions in the core of the League's current approach and methodology in tackling Joint Arab Work, a qualitative research was applied through literature review of previous work, review of previous initiatives launched by the league that was not implemented on the ground, through related documents and secondary resources.

As a result, and after analyzing a wide range of unconcluded plans, unimplemented resolutions and failed Joint Arab Work attempts, it was really obvious that failure dominated the work and results of the Arab League in promoting Joint Arab Work as a fact before and after 1990.

Introduction

Problem of the study

One purpose that I looked forward to achieve from accomplishing this study is providing some insight into the current performance of one of the important regional organization in the Arab region or the first if it should be called so, and the reasons behind such performance.

With all the current developments occurring in the Arab system, the latest revolts is on the top of it, and the failure to establish any kind of mutual cooperation based on unity between the Arab countries, all this made the voices of the critics rise and gave them a reason to start a harsh attack on the so called the League of Arab States (LAS) or Arab League that can be defined as an international agency established in the early months of 1945 which in 1962 added the thirteenth independent Arab state to its membership roster(1).

The problem of describing and analyzing the Arab League as a regional organization is that there are no authoritative standards against which to judge the operations of any regional organization, the first task then after having a brief on the historical background of the League is to define such standards, which I did in details in chapter two. The problem still remains , nevertheless , of defining and describing – if only with the broadest terms – Regional organization after having such standards clear in mind.

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(1) The League of Arab States, A study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization by Robert W. Macdonald, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1965 p.3

A near observer to the Arab League's work will note that the –limited- achievements it had within its history were always connected whether by proper acknowledgements of the risks that threatened the Arab system, or surrounded by a healthy environment for the Inter-Arab relations.

For Example, the success of the league's council in addressing the Iraqi- Kuwaiti problem in 1961 versus a total failure from the side of the Security Council in addressing the same issue, was due to the united position Arab countries took back then and Leaving previous disputes behind. The basis on which the league based its position was the necessity to preserve the principles constituting the Arab system, among these maintaining the territorial integrity of its members as well as rejecting use of force principle in inter-Arab relations.

On a similar basis, the achievements from the two Arab summits held in Cairo and Alexandria in 1964 emerged from the emancipation of the need to address the Israeli ambitions in Arab water in parallel with the need to work on building a Palestinian entity.

And the same thing applies on the historical achievement for Khartoum Summit in August 1967 which followed Israeli occupation to some Arab Territories. In 1987 also Amman Summit was held which had the credit to bring life again to Egyptian-Arab relations motivated with the sense of possible repercussions of the escalated Iraqi-Iran conflict at that time. 1996 and 2000 summits were held in Cairo fearing the consequences of the change that occurred in Israeli policy towards peaceful settlements and adopting the use of excessive force in dealing with the Palestinian people.

The Limited successes of the league as mentioned seem to be associated with specific institutional, political or ideological resources from the league could draw its

activity and many argue that The pact of the League is one of the major reasons of the League's Weakness and the reason goes back to the conditions that was dominating in the region when the League was established(2).

Such limited success was associated also with a consensus from the Arab states on a certain position, the political power that was provided to the League and gave it the ability to function well as designed and as required to record achievements.

Today, with so much happening in the Middle East region that was characterized as one of the most ethnically fragmented regions in the world Surrounded by both Regional and Global Axes of Conflict. Questions of Arab Unity as well as Joint Arab cooperation are in most need to be asked.

(2) Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 160

Hypotheses and Questions of the Study

The study has two main hypotheses; Joint Arab Action suffers a crisis and this crisis is due to the lack of political will provided from Arab countries to the League of Arab States in order for it to perform well, the hypothesis claims the Arab League as a failed organization in the experience of regional cooperation.

These two hypotheses will be studied through addressing the following questions:

1. What do Collective Arab work encompass;
2. To what extent did the efforts of the Arab League in this regard succeed in establishing a base for such collective work.
3. Whether the (Responsibility to strengthen relations and increase Cooperation among Arab countries) doctrine has a direct impact on Arab League's actions.

Effectiveness, though has been a key element in the assessment, monitoring And evaluation, but has been so far diluted in terms of being insufficient in Providing measurable indicators.

4. Clarify the conceptual as well as the operational aspects of the League's Initiatives in building a base for collective cooperation through analyzing their relevance, coherence and priority.

Through this analysis and as a conclusion, the study endeavors to analyze The effectiveness of the Arab League's measures and priority of action. The Study attempts to come up with recommendation for a new or enhanced Collective Arab Work model applicable within current Regional and Global Axes of conflict .

Importance of the Study

As the Arab system is passing now through one of the most serious stages of its development in the light of global and regional changes that founded and created a new situation in the region which poses a real threat to Arab interests.

This fact reflects the necessity to deal with such developments in a manner that removes all impurities in inter-Arab relations and resolves all pending issues in a serious context to strengthen the foundations of the Arab system and find a base for its cooperative relations.

And since the Arab League is the main corporation founded to generate collective Arab work, the responsibility of the failure of any joint regional action falls on its shoulders.

Going back to the achievements history of the Arab League in generating cooperation in the political, military, and economic spheres between Arab countries, a bleak experience and limited success will be found.

Some authors[(4)] suggested that the league represents a failed experience in regional cooperation. The suggested failure of the league was not only in generating cooperation in the political, military and economic spheres -which is the core of the study- but also to prevent and manage regional conflicts. Since its birth in March 1945 and when the league received its final endorsement from the group of the six founding states (Iraq, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt). The Arab League has been the oldest functioning regional organization that was a part of a broad and ambitious political project that could have led, at

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[(4)] Lindholm Schulz, Helena and Schulz, Michael. 2005. 'The Middle East: Regional Stability and Fragmentation', in M,Farrell, B.Hettne and L.van Langenhove (eds), Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice. London & Ann Arbor: Pluto Press

least in the intentions of some of its supporters, to the creation of a single Arab State in the Middle East. As a first step towards this final goal, the member states rejected the recourse of force for the settlement of disputes between them. And in the second article of its charter it stated clearly that the relations between state members should be strengthened, Political plans should be coordinated, in order to reach the goal of a regional cooperation. And the ninth article of its charter permits a stronger cooperation and relations than the one stated by the charter.

Yet, since 1945 the Middle East experienced Inter-state and colonial wars and disputes, the Gulf War have caused at least 1.5 million casualties. The Middle East has also been plagued by a series of protracted civil wars and ethnic struggles, which have led to the death of at least two million and the displacement of millions more, in particular in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen(5).

Viewing the Previous results the League's performance was judged severely (6). And the academic discussion on the League today was no longer centered on whether or not the league can be considered as a 'failed organization' but rather on establishing what accounts for it's failure- a 'failure of design' as opposed to having been 'designed to fail'(7).

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(5) Hassouna, Hussein A. 1975. The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts. New York: Dobbs Ferry.

(6) Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 95
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(7) Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 1-180

z

Not to mention that the need for co-operation among Arab states has always been considered paramount. Reasons cited are social , economic, political, and strategic. The psychological underpinnings of Arab Unity have also been a major factor in the drive towards this unity.

The League of Arab States is an institution created to foster the drive. The goal is to unity , in the long run, all the small sovereign states members of LAS. In such a union, certainly , potentials exist for improvement of the individual state economies via all the other positive elements. But also simultaneously, the problem-area of equity and welfare associated with the distribution of gains from co-operation (and hence union) need be resolved.

These elements are of interest to the policy makers in the LAS as well as to those in the Arab Multilateral Funds has in most of its activities paid considerable attention to this parameter, even though at a higher and perhaps more complex plane – i.e., the Organization of Islamic Conference[3].

These are this a few major factors enticing us to take up the subject in the hope of elucidating the state of affairs of LAS s it is today

[3] H.B Sharabi, Government and politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962), p.160-169

The Importance of the League

What the league meant (and kept to preserve this meaning) to Arab Leaders and masses was kind of a success that can be recorded in its achievements.

- It acted as a national platform.

Even though it is ordinary for the Arab governments to favor national sovereignty on Arab nationalism , if they both contradicted.

But it is also usual that the states take into account that their known position in any of the league's conferences is framed with Arab nationalism, so it maintained this function even though only as a symbol (39)

- The Arab countries always used the league as a shelter from taking the blame and the responsibility of the failure of the Joint Arab work and for the Israeli – Arab conflict, they need it to keep it carrying out this function in front of their Arab masses at least !

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(39) أنظر : جلال فاروق الشريف, (1982), للجامعة دورا يمكن أن تضطلع به, شؤون عربية, العدد 13, ص 106-107

Objectives of the study

A more nuanced assessment of the contributions of the institutional bodies of the Arab League to regional management, thus providing a more precise basis not only for assessing real achievements of regional and sub-regional institutional frameworks in the Middle East, but also for orienting the process of internal reform that such organization urgently need to undertake in order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness in launching joint initiatives.

Though there is no clear reference to when did the literature on assessing Joint regional work in the Middle East emerged But the topic of Arab League's performance in this regard gained wider attention from both scholars and politicians after the developments in the region kept escalating and deteriorating with little improvements taking place. Even if discussed the attention was brought to how the League failed in preventing and managing conflicts in the region and not so much focusing on the cooperation generated in other different spheres.

What Does This Study Add

Even the most recent literature on the Arab League draws almost exclusively on the comparative works of Joseph Nye and Mark Zacher[8] . The most recent work analyzed in this regard was concerning conflicts and political reform in the region. And even these studies that have been analyzed ended respectively in 1967 (Second Yemen Civil War) and in 1977 (Libya-Egypt border war).

Nye's work in fact only looks at three interventions of the Arab League in Regional conflicts.

I found no detailed comprehensive or systematic study on the effectiveness of the Arab League in performing one of the most important as well as basic goals that it has been founded for which is Launching regional initiatives and enhancing Joint Arab Work or even on how the League is approaching regional cooperation, This is what my study will provide through looking back carefully at previous history, assessing and providing new approached effective and applicable on a regional level to be managed and launched by the Arab League.

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[8] Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 115-120

Research Methods

The study will depend mainly on descriptive critical analysis but will also resort to statistical data to a minor extent, in addition to content analysis for purposes of comparisons and correlations.

The study will cover Arab League's interventions and initiatives in the region. And the first step forward from the Published research on Joint Arab Work is to 'go back to the data' and provide an updated, comprehensive review of initiatives launched by the Arab League in this regard since its foundation.

To do this, I am looking into a reliable resource that clarifies the latter which is in fact scarce and needs a good research work.

For Analyzing the record of the Arab League, an updated set of previous records on the Arab League is needed, which i found in the good work of Destin Development Studies Institute. That were mostly gathered through Lexis News.

Tools of the study will focus on both primary and secondary resources. The researcher will contact Arab League's officials. As secondary resources, the researcher will depend on international academic journal, various publications, reports, internet websites and books.

As regards method of evaluation of performance of the League of Arab States, there are three approaches that can be used for this purpose :

One is according to popular expectation in which case judgments are passed based on peoples expectations of what an institution ought to achieve. Here, criteria used are so illusive and most often unfair to the institution being evaluated that results are bound to be unsatisfactory, no matter how efficient that institution may have been. Since expectations are difficult to realize at least in the same scope and context often envisioned at this popular level, institutions evaluated by this methodology are often considered failure.

And the other is its pact, the standards that were drawn for the institution since its inception, and the third is according to considering it a regional organization and evaluating it to what a regional organization should achieve, Detailed discussion on this is followed in chapter two.

Past Literature

Though there is no clear reference to when did the literature on assessing Joint regional work in the Middle East emerged But the topic of Arab League's performance in this regard gained wider attention from both scholars and politicians after the developments in the region kept escalating and deteriorating with little improvements taking place. Even if discussed the attention was brought to how the League failed in preventing and managing conflicts in the region and not so much focusing on the cooperation generated in other different spheres.

- The Failure of the Arab League

There seems to be no doubt among analysts that the main institutional framework in the Middle East –the Arab League- has proven to be at best a 'bleak' experience of regional cooperation [(9)], and at worst the single least effective major regional organization in generating political and military cooperation to prevent and manage regional conflicts[(10)].

[(9)] Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 160-170

[(10)] Evans, Gareth. 1993.Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. St Leonards: Allen and Unwin.p.30-31

The empirical foundations of the latter claim lay mainly in the comparative studies of Joseph Nye (1971) and Mark Zacher (1979).

Nye compares the work of three 'macro-regional political organizations' the organization of American States (OAS), the organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League- in managing nineteen conflicts between 1948 and 1970. He concludes that the average weighted success rate of the Arab League (263) lags well behind those of the (OAS) (856) and of the OAU (418).

Zacher considers 116 conflicts that occurred world wide between 1946 and 1977 and suggests that the Arab League successfully mediated in 12 percent of the conflicts which took place in the region. Suggesting overall that the league met with success in only six of seventy-seven conflictual situations it attempted to settle between 1945 and 1981 .

Again focusing on war mediating issues only not assessing other aspects of regional cooperation.

The proximate causes of the under-performance of the league are apparent. It boosts ambitious goals and a powerful symbolic association to a widespread transnational ideology; and yet, as the hands of its crucial organs are tied by the unanimity rule, its agenda (is little more than the lowest common denominator) of the desires of its member states[11].

The gradual shrinking of the league's prerogatives in the process that led to final the pact testifies how its member states showed early on great reluctance to assign substantial powers to a supra-national institution. The league, in other words seems to incarnate the ambiguities

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(11) Seabury, Paul. 1949. 'The League of Arab States: Debacle of a regional Arrangement', International Organization 3(4):p. 600-620

of the pan-Arab project at its height, trapped between ‘the quest for Arab unity and the centrifugal forces favoring Arab separatism.

However, how exactly such ambiguities impacted on the allegedly disastrous performance of the League in dealing with regional conflicts is still contentious. The traditional realist argument interprets this ‘failure’ as the consequence either of the influence of hegemony.

Mainly Nasser’s Egypt which monopolized the work of the League, or of the presence of a range of opposing coalitions and interests in the region. Zacher’s analysis shows in detail the empirical basis for claiming that ‘more than any other region, the Arab World has been characterized by shifting patterns of dissension and competition’(12).

Between 1946 and 1977, it witnessed at least nine different configurations of opposing blocs, typically generated by local strategic and dynastic quarrels, the development of the ‘nonaligned movement’ and Cold War rivalries.

This State-centric analytical approach has been recently contested by Michael Barnett and Etel Solingen. Tackling the issue from a social constructivist perspective, they suggested that the debacle of the Arab League was deliberately ‘designed to fail’.

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(12) Zacher, Mark. 1979. International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1949-77: The United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, and Arab League. New York & London: Praeger p.167

And they Argue that 'the politics of Arab Nationalism and a shared identity led Arab states to embrace the rhetoric of Arab Unity in order to legitimize their regimes, and to fear Arab Unity in practice because it would impose greater restrictions on their sovereignty' [13]

This is what I am arguing in my research, is it the political will of the Arab states that caused the Arab League to have such performance?

In this sense, the ambiguous approach of Arab countries towards the role of the League in the region would reflect a deeper ambiguity in the bases for the legitimacy of Arab countries, which draw their strength both from local 'civic nationalisms' (wataniya) and from claiming allegiance to the wider Arab identity in the form of a 'trans-national nationalism' (qawmiya).

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[13] Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 160-170

Chapter One

Historical and Institutional Development of the League

Background on the Institutional Framework and Political Developments

The chronicle of the formation of the Arab League has been reported too often to need detailed discussion. Nevertheless, a few significant points are worth reviewing, especially those concerned with the question of the Arab unity versus the less binding regional organization since this question continues to obscure the issue.

Historical Background :

The roots of the Arab League draw on the Pan-Arab projects in the nineteenth century, mainly as a reaction to the decline of Turkish/Ottoman rule over the Arab world[14]. During both World Wars, plans for the creation of a unified Arab state or Arab federation were actively (although largely instrumentally, as in the case of the 1916 Arab Revolt) supported by the British.

So going back to the beginnings with further details, and just as Arab nationalism had its origin in the dependant Ottoman Arab province of Syria before World War I, so the same area was the locus of a movement toward unity after the (Balkanization) following World

[14] Khadduri, Majid. 1946. 'The Arab League as a regional Arrangement', The American Journal of International Law 40(4): p.700.

War I when Jordan, Palestine, and part of Lebanon were carved out of the province. During the early years of World War II, spurred by the abortive anti-British coup d'état in Iraq in 1941, the British government determined to gain the support of the Arab Leaders in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq by lending its support to some form of regional amalgamation. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden announced the new policy on May 29, 1941, the day after the collapse of the Rashid Ali revolt in Iraq. As he spoke, As he spoke, Axis forces were at the Egyptian frontier, and free French forces had yet to move into Vichy-French Syria and Lebanon. He said in part :

(The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last War, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out toward this unity, they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval) [(15)].

Within a few days, the British were able to move to support the claims of the Lebanese and Syrians against the French that the former League of Nations Mandates were null and void and that the two countries should be considered independent. When no overt moves toward the a realization of the long cherished dream of unity materialized, Mr. Eden repeated his pledge. In answer to a parliamentary interlocution on February 24, 1943, he

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[(15)] The League of Arab States, A study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization by Robert W. Macdonald, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1965, P.8

stated that (so far as I am aware no such scheme, which would command general approval, has yet been worked out)

During the spring of 1943, Nuri as-Said of Iraq came forward with a plan calling for immediate federation of Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, and Jordan under the sponsorship of the United Nations. He also proposed the establishment of an Arab League to be formed initially by Iraq and the new Syrian state but open to all other Arab states. In Nuri's Plan, the (Arab League) was to have a permanent council nominated by member states and responsible for defense, foreign affairs, currency controls, communications customs education, and the protection of minority rights. The plan was circulated to other Arab Leaders and made available to British authorities, was limited to what in Arab views amounted to political reconstitution of (Geographical Syria). A special administrative regime, under international guarantee, was proposed for the Christian Maronites in Beirut. In Palestine, Jewish inhabitants were to be granted autonomous administration where they formed a majority of the population. Jerusalem however is to become an international city. Nuri's plan was thus in general agreement with the long-standing goals of the Arab nationalist movement, for example (Fertile Crescent) unity and with wartime Arab preoccupations with the (Palestine Problem). It is doubtful that Nuri meant any more by his term (The Arab League) than a political confederation of Arab states that would eventually become a sovereign political entity[16].

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[16] Ahmad M.Goma'a (1977) The Foundation of the League of Arab States, wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics, 1941-1945. London: Longman. P.22

Birth of the League :

The encouragement and support provided by the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was explicitly declared to help Arab countries to achieve a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy, which apparently prompted some action by the Arab side where In January 1943, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Said made a public project for the creation of a unified Arab state encompassing Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan, (More details on Nuri's plan is to come). Al Said's fertile crescent scheme was not greeted with enthusiasm in the region, yet in September 1944 , the representatives of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Egypt agreed to meet in Alexandria to discuss the possibility of establishing some form of political union across the Arab world, the final document of meeting known as Alexandria Protocol. Provided the blue print for a loose confederation of (Independent Arab States), which would have held periodic meetings to strengthen the relations between those states and favored political cooperation. A modified version of the Alexandria Protocol was signed on 22 March 1945 in Cairo by the delegates of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and became the foundational pact of the league of the Arab states. Yemen Joined the league two months later in may 1945[17].

Factors leading to the creation of the Arab League (General Context)

In spite of the call for the Arab unity that has been put forward, since several centuries, yet still the idea of setting up an Arab Organization to gather the Arab countries together, did not crystallize - or in other words- its features were not elaborated except during the Second

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[17] The League of Arab States, A study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization by Robert W. Macdonald, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1965, P.33

World War, due to Arab, Regional and International changes where the features of the Arab system started to formulate.

But something interesting and worth mentioning in this context, is when one goes back to the published literature reading about the establishment of the league, One always finds a linkage of the start of the league with the blessing of the British that was declared by the famous Eden's speech, as if this blessing was the only reason Arab came forward with plans and thoughts to establish such regional arrangement to unify their ranks, and this linkage is the reason why the league is attacked in many occasions by critics and described as a British conspiracy.

But a close observer would discover that many other factors led to this inception On the Arab Level, we can say that the Arab awareness of common identity formed the corner stone for this historical development.

The following factors may deserve to be seen :

First:

The atmosphere of war, was absolutely suitable for the growth of national movements and activity of resistance against the presence of aggression, which was- in turn - reflected on the independence of an increasing number of Arab countries, while -at the same time- has generated the need to establish a kind of balance between the political powers, in which Egypt has played a very active role.

Second:

The need for unity grew stronger in conjunction with the awareness of the Zionist movement dangers, the flocking of Zionist emigrations to Palestine and the conspicuous role played by the mandate power "Britain", so as to realize the dream of the Jewish State.

Third:

The educational missions have led the Arabs to the exposure needed to augment the receptiveness of new ideas and political trends, which have been spreading and on top of which was the national idea.

Fourth:

There was a considerable volume of commercial exchange and free movement and transfer of individuals between the Arab East countries, in a way that appeared as if it will ensure the material, spiritual, cultural and tentative basis for unity.

Reactions and circumstances that surrounded the formation of the league :

In Egypt, Nahhas Pasha, then Egyptian premier, declared in a speech read to the Chamber of Deputies on March 30, 1948 that he had studied Eden's speech and had come to the conclusion that the Egyptian government should take up the matter officially and should discover the opinion of the various Arab governments and at what they aim. " He proposed to serve as a sort of mediator " to reconcile the differing contradictory views as far as possible " and to hold a meeting in Egypt to work out a program for the "Arab Union."

Meetings were subsequently held during the summer of 1943 and the winter and early spring of 1943-44 between Nahhas Pasha and leaders of each of the Arab states in turn.

The complete record of the discussions is not available, but a memorandum dated August 24, 1948, from the Emir Abdullah to his prime minister – who was about to go to Cairo for talks with Nahhas Pasha – probably gives a fair picture of the scope of the discussions at that time." Referring to talks on Arab unity between Nuri As-Sa'id (Iraq) and Mustafa An-Nahhas (Egypt), Abdullah strongly reaffirmed to need to " reunite Syria" as a counterbalance between Iraq and Egypt and dwelt on the necessity for an equitable solution to the Palestine problem. Then, broadening his view, Abdullah suggested that Lebanon be allowed to join the proposed Arab union, always safeguarding Syria's "rights" (to former Syrian territories included in the Lebanese mandate by the French) ; that an understanding was needed with the Sultan of Morocco and the Boy of Tunis on the subject of the Arab union; and that Egypt, "one of the loading Arab countries ." was welcome to join the union. Special provisions were to be made for Saudi Arabia and Yemen, on religious grounds, but these countries were to be kept informed of the progress of the talks. Libya, still under Allied military control, was expected to have "Arab" status, but the question was open.

Following the extended series of bilateral discussions, Nahhas Pasha announced in July 1944 that the Arab states had been invited to a joint conference in Cairo to consider actions to be taken. When the conference convened on September 25, 1944, at Alexandria instead of Cairo, the participating delegations were from Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Trans-Jordan; observers were present from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Morocco, and Palestine .

The primary problem of the conference was that of an appropriate structural organization. According to participants in the conference , three forms of political organization were debated :

(1) a unitary state with central political authority.

(2) a federated state with a central parliament and executive committee with full political power over federal issues.

(3) a loose confederation with emphasis on coordination and cooperation.

"For various reasons, the first two types of organization were unacceptable to all the conferences. The third form, the confederation, was thus selected by common agreement. The First article of the "Alexandria Protocol," the document developed by the conference (see Appendix A), emphasized that a league (of Arab States) will be formed of the independent Arab states which consent to join the League. It will have a Council which will be known as the "Council of the League of Arab States" in which all participating states will be represented on an equal footing.

The objectives of the League, by now far removed from the goal of Arab unity, were declared to be to supervise the execution of agreements made by member states, to strengthen the relations between the states, to supervise in a general way the interests of the Arab countries, to coordinate their political plans and to insure cooperation among them, and to protect their sovereignty and independence. Resolutions of the League's Council were to be binding only on those states which accepted them.

Once the choice of political organization had been made, the conference could move to a consideration of internal structure and functions. This work was done in six committees

concerned, respectively, with political, social, economic , health, cultural , and communications problems. The subjects of joint defense and foreign policy proposed in Nuri's "Blue Book," were eliminated from consideration and one or two other categories were absorbed into other subject headings. The committee framework thus stressed technical or "functional" activities, including the provisions of economic and cultural ties emphasized by Eden in 1941 and 1948 and endorsed by the United States". About one-third of the completed Alexandria protocol was devoted to the subject of "cooperation in economic, cultural, social , and other matters', while political coordination is mentioned in only the most general terms (e.g., coordination of foreign policies and agreement not be use force in the settlement of disputes between members[18].

The Alexandria Protocol was essentially a memorandum of understanding . Provided for further study of appropriate forms of cooperation in both the political and functional spheres in preparation for a general Arab conference to draw up a constitution for the proposed Arab League. The draft agreement was signed by delegates from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Trans-Jordan; the Saudi and Yemeni representatives referred the Protocol to their governments, which adhered in January and February, respectively , of the following year. Observers from Morocco and other Arab countries expressed their hope for eventual affiliation.

The decisions of the conferences at Alexandria in the fall of 1944, therefore, were in favor of a cooperative association whose major role would be that of a coordinating agency in the field of common political and functional activities. The idealistic drive toward some

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(18) Ahmad M.Goma'a (1977) The Foundation of the League of Arab States, wartime Diplomacy and Inter-Arab Politics, 1941-1945. London: Longman. P.41-50

form of Arab unity subsided in the face of practical politics. Although the conferences delegates wrote into the Protocol the hope "that Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step {the formation of a loose league} by other steps, " subsequent events seem to indicate that the words merely provided a means of rationalizing the ideal with the practical."

During the winter of 1944-45, the text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were made available to the supporters of the Arab League movement, and the orientation toward a "regional organization" with ties to the future United Nations became increasingly stronger[(19)]. The Egyptian Premier, Nahhas Pasha, is known to have studied reports on the organization and activities of the Union of American Republics during this period. And the strong support of regionalism at UNCIO by the Arabs would seem to indicate that the immediate objective of complete Arab unity had been abandoned, not merely deferred. The final draft of the "Pact of the League of Arab States," (Appendix B) completed in March 1945, makes no allusion to eventual unity. On the contrary, the Pact emphasizes respect for the independence and sovereignty of the League's member states, though Article 9 permits "closer cooperation and stronger bonds" between member states which desire them in the future. It is, therefore, difficult to agree with those Arab critics of the League who maintain that the founders of the organization betrayed the drive toward Arab unity.

The Alexandria Protocol, read as a statement of policy by Arab leaders of the period, demonstrates that all-inclusive Arab unity was not considered a matter for practical politics". And for those who thought it was, Article 9 of the League Charter provided an outlet. Arab

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[(19)] Philip Ireland, (The Pact of the League of Arab States) American Journal of International Law, 39 (October 1945),p. 798.

leaders from the Fertile Crescent were understandably chagrined when the late-arriving Egyptians took over the unity plans of 1948, but some of the innumerable grandiose unity projects since broached by Syrians and Iraqis has ever gone beyond the discussion stage[20].

Moreover, the accretion of diverse independent Arab states of the Arab League since 1945 has decreased rather than increased the potential for the type of true political unification required by dogmatic Arab nationalists. By the soft light of history, it appears that the founders of the Arab League were on sound ground when they rejected political union in favor of regional organization. "Arab unity," nevertheless, remains the sacred cow of the League : it gives little nourishment, but no one dares kill it.

In preparation for the General Arab Congress envisaged by the Alexandria Protocol, a committee of Arab foreign ministers and other experts met in Cairo during February and March 1945 to draft the constitution of the Arab League . The subject had been a matter for lively debate in the Arab capitals in the fall an early winter following the Alexandria conference.

Two days after the approval of the Alexandria Protocol , Nahhas Pasha was relieved of his position as prime minister of Egypt.

The Syrian and Jordanian prime ministers, who had led their delegations to the conference, were also dismissed from their posts, Reaction was particularly violent in Beirut where the Christian Arab community, led by the Maronite patriarch and the Falangists, denounced the Alexandria Protocol as an attack on Lebanese sovereignty. The document

[20] Hasou, Tawfig Y. 1985. Struggle for the Arab World: Egypt's Nasser and the Arab League. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 62-80

which emerged from the preliminary drafting committees, however, generally confirmed the ideas of the Alexandria Protocol.

The General Arab Congress convened in Cairo on March 17th to review the draft pact, and the approved document was signed march 22nd by six of the seven founding members. Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan.

A copy of the pact was sent to the Imam of Yemen, who signed it on May 10, 1945. Unofficial delegations from Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia reportedly requested membership in the League of Arab states during the drafting of the pact, but the final agreement provided that membership was to be restricted to independent Arab states.

The Pact of the League of Arab States is an international treaty signed by the Heads of states or representatives of the founding members and duly ratified by the respective member states. The Pact consists of a preamble , twenty numbered articles, and three annexes, all of which are reproduced in Appendix B. In its brevity, the Pact resembles the League of Nations Covenant more than anything else, and some of its phraseology and provisions seem to have been lifted from either the League Covenant or the draft United Nations Charter. A brief analysis of the principal provisions of the Pact will serve as background for the detailed discussion in later chapters. Reference points are [25] :

(1) Main purpose.

(2) Membership and relations between members, and

(3) Institutional structure.

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[25] Ezzeldin Foda, The Projected Arab Court of Justice (The Hague: Martinius Nijhoff, 1957), pp.6-7

Reference Points

1 . Main purpose

Article 2 of the Pact of the League of Arab States, which amplifies the Preamble, establishes as the purposes of the Organization:

(1) strengthening relations between members states.

(2) Coordinating their policies in order to further cooperation and safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and

(3) A general concern for the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.

In particular, the article provides for "close cooperation" between member states in matters concerning economic and financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, problems of nationality, social affairs, and health.

No mention is made of defense against external attack, coordination of military resources, or uniformity of foreign policy, unlike the Alexandria Protocol, which provided for coordination of foreign policy. The League is, however, to act as a mediator in disputes between members or between a member and a third state according to Article5.

The Pact also provides, in Article 3, for future cooperation with such international bodies as may be formed "in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations." In the vocabulary of functionalism, the primary purpose of the League is to foster Non-political activities and only incidentally to enter the political arena.

2 . Membership and Relations between Members

Membership is restricted by Article 1 to independent Arab states; subsequent to the establishment of the League, any such state may apply for membership.

Members pledge themselves by Article 8, to respect the sovereignty of other member states and not to take any action "calculated to change established systems of government." Member states which voluntarily elect to form "stronger bonds" than provided by the Pact may do so.

Resort to force to settle disputes is, however, prohibited by Article 5. Member states assume an obligation to support the League financially, on a prorated basis to be determined from time to time by the Council. Withdrawal of a member upon one year's notice is permitted, and provisions are made so that errant states may be "separated" from the organization , according to Article 18.

The terminology of the Pact leaves little doubt that the League is to be regarded as no more than a device to coordinate the activities of its members and to keep them from quarreling among themselves. The prospect for political unity under the Pact of the League of Arab States is forsworn by its emphasis on preserving the sovereignty and independence of its members.

An interesting feature of the Pact is its provision for future relations with non-members, particularly in the Arab World.

Article2, which establishes the purpose of the League, includes "general concern with the affairs and interests of Arab countries" and not just for the interests of member states.

Article 4 permits non-member {Arab} delegations to participate in the work of the technical committees. These provisions are reinforced by Annex 2 to the Pact, "Annex Regarding Cooperation with Countries which Are not members of the Council of the League," which establishes a policy for future cooperation with non-member Arab states.

Annex 2 and the other referenced articles of the Pact refer to the expressed desires of the then-dependent Arab areas of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia. As a special case, Annex 1 of the Pact provides that Palestine shall be represented on the League Council, by a person to be selected by the Council, until full independence has been achieved. The membership policy is also oriented toward these potentially independent states, since the Pact was originated by all independent Arab states of the period.

Article 9 and 17 contain two additional provisions for regulation of relations between member states. Article 9 provides that : "Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members."

Nor shall such treaties become null and void. According to Article 17, all such treaties, including both existing and future treaties between members, must be deposited with the Secretary General. This provision, which resembles that of Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is less restrictive that the requirement for unified foreign policy contained in Article 1 of the Alexandria Protocol.

3 . Institutional structure

According to the Pact, the principal organs of the Arab League are the Council and the permanent Secretariat. The Pact specifies that the seat of the League is Cairo. Provision was made for future establishment of an "Arab Tribunal of Arbitration," which would work closely with other international bodies on problems of peace and security; this provision has been debated extensively but never implemented. Technical committees, one for each of the functional areas mentioned in Article 2, are provided to assist the League Council. No other organs were provided by the Pact; an Economic Council and a Joint Defense Council, however, were later provided by a special treaty, in 1950 (see Appendix c). Table 1 illustrates the organization of the League.

The organization established by the Pact appears to have combined the principal provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the operating experience of the League's Council. The Arab League Council, unlike that of the League of Nations, comprises all members of the organization. The need for an Assembly such as that of the League of Nations was therefore obviated .

On the other hand, the Arab League Pact specifically provides for technical committees to assist the League Council . The League of Nations Council developed the institution of the technical committee over a period of years outside the specific provisions of the Covenant.

In the initial form, the institutional structure of the league was centered around two core bodies – the council and the permanent Secretariat and a number of permanent committees. All member states have one seat and a single vote in the council. Ordinary council sessions

are convened twice per year and its decisions are binding only for members who have voted for them. The position of secretary General, which was covered uninterruptedly by Egyptian nationals until 1979, was initially conceived as a principally administrative position, but rapidly acquired greater prominence than the other League bodies as the real steering force behind the league's regional activism. The pact also provided for the creation of various specialized committees focused on cultural and economic issues. These committees were supplemented in November 1946 by the political committee, whose competences largely overlapped with those of the council but also because of its less formalized procedures, gradually acquired significant prominence at the latter[21].

The duty of the council to intervene in any regional dispute, as envisaged by the Alexandria Protocol (the council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between member state or power) was incorporated in the final pact. (the council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states , or a member state and a third state, However, when the modalities and procedures for such interventions as specified by the 1945 pact are considered, the league seems to have lost its teeth, when compared to the spirit of the institutional framework outlined in the Alexandria protocol[22]. While article 5 of the pact prohibits the use of force between members and allows arbitration and mediation decisions in regional disputes to be taken by the council with a majority vote, article 6 adds that in case of aggression, the council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures that are deemed necessary to deal with such

[21] الدكتور مجدي حماد, (2007), جامعة الدول العربية مدخل إلى المستقبل, عالم المعرفة : الكويت ص 30-35

[22] The League of Arab States, A study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization by Robert W. Macdonald, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1965, P.41

acts. Also because the text does not provide a clear definition of aggression . all regional disputes and conflicts since the foundation of the league have with few minor exceptions been portrayed by member states and approached by the league as aggressions and each resolution had to undergo a lengthy and complex process of consensus building.

A quick look at the League's performance

The Disastrous [(23)] Failure of the League members to agree on the membership of the newly – created Palestine government based in Gaza and the military and diplomatic debacle of the Arab states in the 1948-49 Arab/Israeli war partially downsized these expectations and inaugurated a gradual process of formal and informal adaption of the league's legal features and internal procedures. In 1950, the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (usually known as the Arab Collective Security Pact) was signed to ensure a higher level of cooperation against external threats. The secretary general also assumed an increasingly active role in representing the interests of the Arab World in post-colonial negotiations – such as in the British – Italian negotiations over Libya[(24)] in mediating inter-Arab disputes, and in coordinating the policies of Arab states in the UN security council.

After a mixed performance in the 1950s and early 1960s, during which the league played an active role in ensuring the independence of Kuwait but was incapable of influencing the course of the first Lebanese Civil War, a further informal component of the League's

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(23) Seabury, Paul. 1949. 'The League of Arab States: Debacle of a regional Arrangement', International Organization 3(4):P. 640.
(24) Elmandjra, Mahdi Saadi. 1957. The League of Arab States, 1945-1955. Phd(Econ) Thesis, University of London, London school of Economics, P.278-283.

operational structure was added by president Nasser, who inaugurated in 1964 the practice of (summit conferences) of the Arab heads of state. These summits held one every one or two years, created a new form for policy coordination in the Arab world, but also further marginalized the role of the main institutional bodies of the league.

Chapter Two

The Arab League as a regional organization

General Views

This chapter is very important when it comes to the desire of evaluating the Arab League which is the core of this research, because the question then appears evaluating it according to which standards ?

Here comes the need to have or establish some Terms Of Reference to go back to when going through the work of the league later on in this research.

Macdonald who studied the Arab League thoroughly chose to consider the league as a regional organization and evaluated it accordingly and stated his reasons for that [26] and if we chose to deal with it as a regional organization which i will then it seems interesting to know that the Arab league is the only regional organization that was deprived from one of the most important properties of regional organizations and that is having an independent will towards its members in addition to the mysterious legal relationship between the league and its members more on that will be later in the research , while on the other hand an Arab

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[26] The League of Arab States, A study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization by Robert W. Macdonald, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1965, P.4-17

researcher in the Arab League affairs who worked in the League for more than 15 years Dr. Majdi Hammad , said that evaluating the league should be done according to one of two criteria's :

1- The pact of the Arab League and in this case the League's achievements will be enormous since the pact of the league sets the league as Least denominator organization, so any achievement will be good according to it.

2- Or on the other hand evaluating the league according to the expectations of the Arab masses that were hanged on it. And in this case the league would seem nothing but a failure.

For the purpose of this research I will take the three points of view in consideration, so the TOR in evaluating the league would be :

1- The Arab League as a regional organization.

2- The Arab League according to its pact.

3- The Arab League according to expectations and aspirations of Arab unity.

According to Macdonald, the League and since its inception in 1945, has been consistently condemned by two types of critics :

(1) Those within the Arab world who object that the Arab League is an inadequate substitute for genuine Arab Unity.

(2) And those outside the Arab World who maintain that the League has failed because it has failed to achieve Arab Unity. Both sets of critics are guilty of the same error.

He further continues to state that to evaluate the organization in terms of its approach to or withdrawal from Arab unity is to misunderstand the problem or to substitute another

problem and another terms of reference, the discussion above has shown that the founders of the League of Arab states made a definite, if reluctant decision against Arab unity and in favor of regional organization.

We need to develop a clear parameters with analytical approach to well approach the discussion of the Arab League.

For starters, The growth of regional organizations has been one of the major developments in the field of international organization since the end of World War II, Yet with all these organizations around little agreement exists on the organization, objectives, and dynamics of regional organization in the abstract.

The League of Arab states or Arab League in definition is an international agency established in the early months of 1945 which in 1962 added the thirteenth independent Arab state to its membership roster[27].

One of the problems of describing and analyzing the Arab League as a regional organization is that there are few authoritative standards against which to Judge the operations of any regional organization, So accordingly we need to define a set of standards to judge the Arab League.

But also here might rise the problem of the some who deny the Arab League to be a regional organization at all. For the purposes of this study we will declare it as an international organization with reasons that will be stated early this chapter.

[27] Tripp, Charles. 1995. 'Regional Organizations in the Arab Middle East',in L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order.P.16-30

Two divergent approaches to a regional organization, (1) Regionalism as an approach to (International Security) that is International cooperation in the political field. Such regional security pacts offered a good chance to deter aggression (From outside the region) by insuring that any such act would be met by prompt automatic counteraction from within the region. The working principle of such approach was said to be that successful use of a regional body required continuing and sincere efforts to resolve problems before a conflict could arise.

This principle, in turn argued for a permanent body of negotiators of each regional group, a permanent inter-national civil service of administrators and technical experts was to carry on the day to day business of each organization.

In a different context, Functional Integration approach seeked International cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, science and health fields.

While this idea seems to have no direct relation to the overriding political problem of regional security, and the original advocates of functional integration based their proposals on the theory that war is caused by economic and social inequalities, among other things, and that regional co operation in these spheres on a non-political level would contribute to regional peace and thus to international security.

Therefore it appears to have two essential functions for a regional organization, the first is to contribute to international security under the general supervision of the universal organization. And the second is to promote regional functional Integration in cooperation with the universal organization.

Somehow it comes to mind to mention here what was the attitude of American policy planners towards the role of regional organization in the postwar world, and this will come later to a lot of discussion since it is suggested in this study that the Western position from Arab Unity and in specific the American position comes to be one of the biggest challenges that faced the success of the Arab League.

Their attitude was typified by Cordell Hull, who wrote in his memoirs:

In general, however, we did not oppose regional and other special arrangements supplementary to the general international organization as long as these did not infringe on the powers we thought should reside in the world wide association of nations. We recognized the freedom of actions of small nations to make such regional arrangements among themselves as might be to their mutual advantage. As an example we viewed with sympathy the plans for an Arab Union, particularly in the economic and social fields. We had made clear our desire to see the Pan American system of cooperation continued and strengthened in the post war period as part of the general plan for international cooperation[28].

But as regarded Regional Security , Secretary Hull felt that regional arrangements patterned after the inter-American system could be useful in the overall struggle to maintain world peace only under the aegis of the universal agency. Regional and social programs were to be encouraged, but only the great powers were to be trusted with security matters.

Arab views on the functions of Regional Organization at San Francisco

(28) Hull, op.cit., p.1644

At San Francisco, in the wake of the heady springtime victories by the United Nations forces in Europe, the proceedings of UNCIO soon made it painfully obvious that the smaller nations –- with their primary concern for regional arrangements –- did not entirely subscribe to the views of the Great Powers. A half-conscious move was already afoot in non-European regions to cast off the remaining vestiges of 19th century colonial empires. Wary of the control of the Security Council by the major powers, the smaller nations sought to define "regional arrangements" as established by Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals in such a way that regional security became an *internal* matter and that prepared the path for full-scale functional integration at the regional level[(29)].

Among the delegations at San Francisco, two groups of small nations emphasized the importance of sound regional organizations – but always under the aegis of the United nations : the Latin American states members of the established Union of American Republics[(30(], and five Arab states, members of the newly formed Arab League. These delegations sought to formalize the principle of regional representation in the Security Council , a concept originally proposed by Summer Welles. They tended to emphasize the importance of the proposed Economic and Social Council, the embodiment of the principle of functionalism, and recommended that it be given autonomous status. More significantly,

[(29)] The League of Arab States, A study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization by Robert W. Macdonald, Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press 1965, P.9

[(30(]The Pan American Union is the popular but incorrect name often applied to this predecessor organization of the organization of American states. The union of American Republics was founded in 1890, and was represented in Washington by a commercial Bureau, in 1910 this Commercial Bureau was renamed the Pan American Union. Finally in 1948, a new charter was adopted reorganizing the inter-American system and giving it the name Organization of American states, with the Pan American Union as its permanent secretariat.

perhaps, they cooperated in an effort to define the functions of the "regional arrangements" mentioned in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

The five Arab League states, acting through the Egyptian delegation, proposed the following definition of regional arrangements for inclusion in the United Nations Charter:

"There shall be considered as regional arrangements organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise between them and for the maintenance of peace and security in their region, as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of economic and cultural relations".

The terms of reference of the definition summed up the position of the regionalists. In the first place, the definition emphasized functional integration, in the interests of the regional states; regional security were made the concerns of the regional states. In other words, regional security is an *internal* matter. Such a concept was at variance with the Great Power idea of regional security which alternately prepared for an recoiled from potential conflict between regions. Subsequently, both the Arab states and the Latin American nations sought to revise the draft charter to provide for UN approval of regional organizations and specific acknowledgment of the two existing regional arrangements: the Union of American Republics and the Arab League

The major powers failed to support the definition of regional arrangements advanced by the Arab delegation. The attempts of both the Latin American states and the Arab states to win explicit acknowledgment of their existing regional arrangements under the terms of the new UN Charter also failed. In the final analysis, therefore, the Charter is anything but a

reliable guide to the question of regional arrangements despite the inclusion of the subject in Chapter VIII (Articles 52 to 54).

Article 51/1 is permissive and emphasizes the role of regional arrangements in "dealing with such matters relating to be maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action". The one concession to the regionalist point of view is the requirement that "such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. " By implication, therefore, regional arrangements should not only seek to maintain international peace and security. They should also seek to foster "international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural , or humanitarian character, " as stated in Article 1/3, which lists the purposes of the United Nations .

Despite the inability of the Arab states to secure approval of their definition of regional organization, the Arab League has always acted as if this were the true and proper definition. And this fact is of considerable significance in understanding the dynamics of the Arab League in action after 1945. It Is also important to recognize the fact that the framers of the Pact of the League of Arab States, themselves all but unknown on the world scene before 1945, were keen students of the trends toward regional organization developed during the interwar era and debated during World War II.

Both Egypt and Iraq, in a sense co-architects of the Arab League, had been members of the League of Nations in the last fateful years of that organization. Both countries were represented at the series of conferences in 1943 and 1944 – UNRRA, Hot Springs, and Breton Woods- when some of the framework of the postwar international community was designed .

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had been available to the Arab leaders in early 1945, before the League of Arab States had been formally constituted . Moreover, Egyptian political leaders who supported the formation of the Arab League are said to have studied reports on the organization, functions, and operations of the Union of American Republics . By April 1945 when UNCIO met in San Francisco, the Arab delegations were thoroughly familiar with the ideas and plans afoot for reconstituting a world peace organization.

In the years since UNCIO, the question of regional security has become of paramount interest in the context of the Cold War. Under the circumstances, however, the well-known "regional security pacts" like NATO, SEATO, and CENTO – composed of both regional and extra-regional powers – have frequently been hailed as regional arrangements under the UN Charter. That this view is erroneous is a major proposition of this study. A few remarks should serve to reveal the source of the error.

In the first place, all the so-called regional security pacts are based on Article 51 of the Charter, which is *outside* the chapter on Regional Arrangements". Article 51 invokes the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense" and was clearly designed to permit local action to counter aggression without waiting for the Security Council to act. In point of fact, Article 51, was a concession to the Latin American states to insure them the right of defense against *external* attack, which at the time could only be expected from one of the five permanent members of the Security Council itself. Article 51 is thus in contradiction of the basic premise of regional organization that regional security is oriented toward the pacific settlement of disputes originating *within* the region.

In the second place, Chapter VIII, Regional Arrangements, of the UN Charter, provides that "o enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional

agencies without the authorization of the Security Council ". And under terms of Article 52/2 , the Security Council is to "encourage the development of pacific settlement of *local* disputes" through regional agencies. Only exceptionally is the Security Council to use regional agencies for enforcement action, and then only "under its authority".

Finally, Article 54 provides that the Security Council "shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation " by regional arrangements for the maintenance of regional security . Who in the West would be so foolish as to inform the UN Security Council of NATO contingency plans, for example, when the organization is oriented toward potential aggression from one of the Council's permanent members?

After defining the set of parameters for a successful regional organization, and comparing these to the action history of the Arab League, Apparently the League of Arab States failed to live up to these standards and more explanation will be detailed throughout the study.

Something Important to mention in this regards, and it states my personal view, any attempt to unify the Arab states on political level will always end with a failure, because of the conflict of interests of all Arab states, each Arab state has its own political agenda even the six founding states of the league when they came to establish the league, no one thought of unity, each state had its own agenda and it will stay this way unless we operate on a non-political level which will then and when the interests of the states become intersected then this will lead to political cooperation and unity , not vice versa! (Even though Dr. Hammad don't agree with this) based on the idea that the in-harmony between the Arab states is caused by economic and social inequalities, among other things, and regional cooperation in these spheres on a non-political level would contribute to regional peace and unity which is the concept of non-political functional Integration.

The Arab League since the beginning was not intended to establish unity, in fact founding states had in mind everything else but unity !

Even the Word League has an in correct use, League should be used when combining different entities and it does not claim unity amongst many things.

Chapter Three

Joint Arab work in its Success and Failure

Before going into the details of this discussion, a general look should be examined in regards to the development of Joint Arab Work during the past six decades of the Arab league's history[31].

1- All the big challenges and disputes that were born since the establishment of the league remained unsolved, on top of it Palestine issue and the Arab unity issue.

2- The conflict between the two approaches of the least denominator approach in Joint Arab work and the maximum limit approach in Joint Arab work and the continuous success of the first approach.

3- The emergence and continuation of certain forces and powers within the Arab system and the dependency to such powers that emerged within the Arab system's organizations.

4- The exposure of the Arab system to the foreign penetration phenomena that had in mind as one of the main goals containing all the efforts of creating Joint Arab work on top of it the British, the French and the Zionist role in the region, and these forces always fought Arab unity and fought all the attempts that looked forward to establishing Joint Arab Work organizations.

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[31] أنظر في تفصيل ذلك الدكتور مجدي حماد, (2007), جامعة الدول العربية مدخل إلى المستقبل, عالم المعرفة : الكويت ص.32 كتاب

5- The continuous criticism and attack on the Arab league as the first and biggest Joint Arab work organization.

6- The successful partition of the Arab world into sub regional systems that depended mostly on foreign powers and favored such dependency on any inter-cooperation and unity.

Taking the previous into consideration, some conceptions or misconceptions have to be cleared out at the outset as regards to the success or failure of joint Arab work in order to help in grasping a criteria of evaluation to different resolutions that will be manifested as examples for success or failure or sometimes success in part and failure in part, at the same time for some practices or resolutions or decisions. The mixed results for some resolutions relies on the scale of majority the decision has received by the Arab states which reflects the strength of the combined determination. It can rely also on the acceptance, enthusiasm or rejection on the part of the Arab masses and in some cases the ability or disability for putting some resolutions into the application on the ground due to acceptance or rejection of the concerned states ,countries or parties.

One concept is perhaps the key word (Joint Arab Work), which will be dealt with In the research as a product of the Arab League, be it Arab summit resolutions of Arab league regular session decisions or decisions of exceptional meetings, or decisions of different Arab councils and unions and subsidiary bodies that are annexed to this research.

Another concept to be cleared is the role of the Arab league and its chief operator, the secretary general, as an administrative body. Had the league been given a mandate at its inception to act on behalf of the Arab states, in the sense of reflecting their political inclinations , the league would be receiving credit or blame for success or repeated failure throughout its long journey. Therefore when we tackle the success or failure, we will be

tackling Arab joint work under the umbrella of the league or at times outside it, which later on will receive the stamp of the Arab League as any joint Arab work will ultimately be streamed in the list of Arab league resolutions or decisions. It is necessary to mention that the right performance of the administrative body of the league must be un credited for the success and exonerated from the burden of failure[32]. (

No secretary general , heavy weight or feather weight has ever been marked along the history of the league as the maker of resolutions and thus been praised or blamed for the outcome, not with standing this argument , the personal flaws or mismanagement in the performance of the secretary general or any of the staff, that might affect the integrity , the status, the image of certain parties , Arab or non Arab, must hold them responsible.

The following items will highlight the most important stations of successful joint Arab work in my view, considering as mentioned earlier , that they might carry some aspects of failure at the same time.

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(32) حليم بركات,(1984), المجتمع العربي المعاصر, مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية : بيروت, ص 277 -280

Stations of successful Joint Arab Work :

1- The presence of the Arab unions and specialized agencies and councils and sub-organizations that are listed in a separate annex, could be of dual perspective, as some consider some of these bodies or sometimes all as a burden and a waste of time and effort and money, and others might consider their presence as an addition to the Arab efforts toward integration. For fairness sake the mere presence of such bodies is to be considered a success while they are to be ranked as failure in regards to the monotony and repetition and duplication of their functions and resolutions. But the idea of a forum or a number of forums that gather Arab professionals in different fields is to be commended as it provides for exchange of experience and knowledge and in certain cases meetings will lead to the adoption of certain codes in many fields of governmental performance and certainly meetings will provide a degree of coordinated joint work. The degree of implementation of the outcomes of meetings and the application of resolutions , is not to be discussed here, as this would need a separate and focused study.

2- But perhaps the treaty of common Defense and Economic cooperation is the one important institution that deserves here some scrutiny , as in maybe more than one instant achieved certain success[(33)].

The Charter of the league mentioned the need of economic and social cooperation in item (2) of the charter. And touched in item (6) some problems that import on the Joint Arab

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(33) Zacher, Mark. 1979. International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1949-77: The United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, and Arab League. New York & London: Praeger, P.85.

Defense. But the charter failed to formulate bodies in regards of economic cooperation and joint defense.

Instead of amending the charter to create these bodies, the Arab countries chose to sign an independent treaty on June 17, 1950 to cover these areas, and that was the treaty of Joint defense and economic cooperation. It is to be considered as an annex to the charter and the first unwritten amendment to the charter.

According to the treaty, the council of Joint defense and economic cooperation was formed.

In 1977 the Arab league extended the mandate of this council to include the social joint work. And it was named to be (The economic and social council). This council was entrusted to implement the goals of the treaty of common defense.

One tends to agree with Dr. Hammad as he described two views on the evaluation of the league's role as a department; one is to look at the means that the charter provides which are very modest. From this perspective, the achievement of the Arab league would seem rather big, and the other is to look at the expectations that the Arab masses hanged on the league, where the achievements would tend to be so limited[34].

This dual judgment would force us to evaluate the league's work in the frame of the charter versus the subjects or the areas of the Arab league's activities. We can say that not with standing the gravity of the mishaps that accompanied the league since it started , one can trace a number of positive results.

Before looking into the areas of achievement, let us examine the achievements from the moral side, and the organizational side.

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(34) الدكتور مجدي حماد, (2007), جامعة الدول العربية مدخل إلى المستقبل, عالم المعرفة : الكويت ص.64

Achievements from the Moral side :

A look upon the Arab morale regarding the Arab league's performance:

- Examine the achievement from the angle of their effect on the morale of the masses, and also the governments is to see what principles thought and values had (fermented) as a result, and how that had reflected on the level of the documents and statements. Here one can be tracing the following :

1- The joint Arab Work, regardless of the criticism it received, has become a value in itself within a set of Arab values, and this will bring us to revisit the issue of the supporters of the pan-Arab nationalist work as a solution to the problems facing the Arab world versus those of the local home-country nationalist work as a first step to success. We shall find that neither of the two sides has found a feasible solution to the Palestinian problem for example and many other problems. It is to be noted that both sides have not rejected openly the idea of Arab unity.

2- We seed to the idea that the main feature of the Arab system is the national feature, it will be necessary to conclude that this conviction about the Arab system is beyond doubt, even among the pessimists who draw question marks sometimes on the need or the usefulness of the unity. There is no question that the Arab conviction has built to the Arab system a wall of immunity and assurance against many risks and dangers.

3- The continuity of the Arab league and the declared inclination to preserve it, in spite of all the hurdles and the pits that obstruct it its course is a testimony to the efficiency of the joint Arab work considering that the league and all the other bodies that deal with collective Arab work represent a symbol to the joint work. This will bring us to say that laying the

blame on the Arab league for failing to solve many problems-in spite of previous reservations is in itself an appreciation to the value of joint Arab work[35].

4-The Arab conviction , the value and the symbol mentioned above have developed to represent a form of limit to border the freedom of movement of any single Arab country to act outside the joint Arab work. This could be called the national legitimacy doctrine.

5- the growing recognition of the negative aspects of the joint Arab work and the danger that they pose on the Arab future by the Arab public opinion and by many Arab intellectuals.

In spite of the fact that the charter has not been amended so far, there is as mentioned elsewhere in this research tremendous development on the level of documentation in the Arab league and other collective work institutions. Some document that improve the work have been added to be adopted and others are in the process. The pacts of Amman economic summit of 1980, the strategy of social Arab work, the draft amendment of the charter and the draft protocol on the controls of Joint Arab work are all examples of improvement . that is of course with the consideration to the contradiction that appears sometimes between what is said and what is done on the Arab level. But this contradiction poses a problem to the Arab states and not to the Arab league itself, or to its general secretariat.

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(35) الدكتور مجدي حماد, (2007), جامعة الدول العربية مدخل إلى المستقبل, عالم المعرفة : الكويت ص.108-113.

<u>A look upon the organizational side :</u>

Here we need to examine the degree of the embodiment of joint Arab work into permanent institutions , and specialized institutions or open – ended (or rather of more general mandate). One would notice in this regard two significant phenomena. One is the institutional continuation and the other is institutional multiplicity.

The Arab league appeared first as a general organization to nurse the joint Arab work at the same time it was the Arab works tool. Its continuity and the probability of continuity in the foreseen future is maybe beyond doubt. This deserves to be studied and to envisage it (ensues), as the Arab system has witnessed many Arab bodies that function within the Arab league or alongside it. Many of these have the elements of continuation.

Among these are : the Arab organization for education, culture and science, the Arab monetary fund, the economic unity council, the Arab postal union and many others.

These Arab institutions, the successful ones and the not very successful, do all enjoy the Arab identity and features, as they include all Arab countries, with Palestine as a full member. These institutions with their openness to the ever occurring variables world wide, tend to acquire new ideas and experience to booster the joint Arab work.

It is felt necessary to point out to the degree in which the league has been able to adapt successfully within the ever-changing circumstances trends and persons in the joint Arab work. The league age wise is older than many Arab countries that were born at their independence.

The league itself played a role in gaining them their independence. It has not failed to perform since its founding in 1945 in spite of many problems and crisis. The Arab countries has kept on hinging to its presence.

The survival of the league through the crisis that faced the Arab world in itself is an achievement.

The league kept marching on in spite of the difficulties that would occur sometimes at the change of its leadership, and also survival along the varying generations of the people that work within the league itself with their varying (provenances) and inclinations, but still loyal to the league's objectives of Arab integration.

In spite of the fact that the league could not develop from a regional organization into a federation or confederation due to many reasons that were dealt with elsewhere in this research, the league has scored achievements in carrying out the functions for which it was intended, in the social, cultural, educational, and health fields. It has acted as an Arab UNESCO, or Arab WHO. Among other things, it has organized an Arab cultural treaty, an Arab union for wireless communications and telecommunications, an air-transport organization, a tourist union, and a nationality agreement. The smaller branches of the league include a federation of Arab new agencies, and Arab film organization. Many of these are sometimes handicapped by irregularity of their budgets or by their bureaucracy, but that has not prevented them from making remarkable achievements.

Perhaps the economic field is the one that the Arab league has the best hope of serving Arab unity in the future. Many inter-Arab agreement have been signed regarding free trade, unification of customs regulation, reduction of tariff between member states and other agreements that are listed in a separate appendix, and mentioned elsewhere in the research.

I will conclude by saying that the growing sense of achievement in the Arab joint work and the increase in the Arab share of responsibility will strengthen their confidence and reduce their sense of injured pride. (Nostalgia) for the Arab past greatness will transform from a national handicap into a minor self-indulgence.

What Kept the League going on..was not the charter [(36)]

Its not the pact nor the traditional International Standards, in fact they are these three elements :

1- The ability to live and survive crisis.

2- The ability to react with the needs of member states.

3- The ability to develop.

The League did not depend on the pact in performing its duties, the pact even lost its attribute as a reference, and because of the continuous rejection from the Arab countries to amend the pact, the league developed further duties , tasks and responsibilities that were not mentioned in the pact, like reacting with other regional arrangements ex: African and the dialogue with Europe..etc also it took it upon itself to get involved in some of the internal conflicts that rose inside the Arab countries and trying to find a settlement.

Its very important when evaluating the work of the league and its achievements to take a deep look into the politics and specifics of the relations between the member states.

[(36)] For more details look read in Seabury, Paul. 1949. 'The League of Arab States: Debacle of a regional Arrangement', International Organization 3(4):633-643.

Since the nature of these relations did not play a positive role in developing Joint arab work but on the contrary it stood as a barrier and it plays an important role in analyzing the status-quo of the league.

- The Middle East is one of the most famous regions in the world known for its continuous struggles and dense conflicts between states.

A one important example of this is the Arab – Israeli conflict that was born in parallel to the establishment of the league.

A new state, a foreign object was born in the Arab region and the Arab league was a an eye witness, how did it react to such major challenge to Palestine in particular and to the Arab's in general ?

It almost dominated and took most of the league's efforts and attention in addition to absorbing most of the member states energy and efforts.

The thing that pushed the whole region into armaments race affecting development efforts in many of the Arab states.

A- Another crisis that faced the league was the suspension of Egypt's membership in the league, whereas Egypt is the main headquarters for it. And of course this was as a reaction to signing Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that was followed with the majority of Arab states consensus on suspending Egypt's membership in the league in Baghdad summit conference in 1978. The headquarters as moved temporarily to Tunisia.

B- The Gulf Wars

The conflicts between member states was more complicated than the league's ability to handle and deal with them.

It is not qualified neither as a constitutional basis nor in its institutional basis(37).

It is very important to be sure that Arab states care about the League as a symbol, but in the same time they hesitate in giving it a bigger role and many factors contribute to that.

No matter what challenges and circumstances faced the league it managed to successfully survive it and adapt with it.

C- The League faced lack of attention even negligence from member states and in many times cruel criticism, and a very clear example on that is :

- The behavior of GCC, their focus was always on the gulf council more than it on the league.
- The ever-increasing number of member states that ceased to pay their financial commitments to the league.
- Also the increasing number of states that ceased to implement the League's resolutions especially when it comes to the Joint national development efforts.
- Not to mention the continuous rejection to participate in (special sessions) that were called to convene in critical situations like Israel's Invasion to Lebanon.
- Also the continuous rejection to discuss any suggested amendments on the league's pact or set a clear protocol for joint Arab work.

This reflects the lack of political will from the member states side to give the league a bigger role!!! Moreover, some of the members started to criticize the league as an association starting from 1985.

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(37) Twinam, Joseph Wright. 1991. 'The Gulf Cooperation Council: The Smaller Gulf States and Interstate Relations', in C. F. Doran and S.W. Buck (eds), The Gulf, Energy and Global Security: Political and Economic Issues. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner. P. 50

The league succeeded to survive and adapt to all these challenges and it did not permanently lose any of its members and further it survived any split[38].

Aspects of Failure

Many negative images must have been mentioned in the research as the adjectives that describe failure went loosely in describing different forms of joint Arab work, and the history of Arab struggle to unify and the formation of the Arab league.

But here we shall try to identify the failure according to some criteria of classification, and perhaps it is safer to employ the same approach that was used with the joint Arab work in its success.

Let us say for starters that both the positive dimensions and the negative ones are always in the consideration or calculation of long term results, the thing that might ease down the pessimist outlook when we trace the many cases of failed Arab work.

The moral side:

1- The phenomena of conflict between those who prefer the narrower outlook to the Arab work, and were labeled elsewhere the home-country nationalists, and those who call for pan-Arab unity, described as pan-Arab nationalists would most of the time end up with the (soloists) winning. This growing trend in placing the interest of one Arab state on a regional Arab group, on top of the interests of the pan-Arab national interest.

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[38] جميل مطر, الجامعة العربية والنظام الإقليمي العربي وتحديات الثمانينات, ص 198

This trend would distort the credibility of the calls for pan-Arab nationalism and lay doubts around this idea.

2- The growing conviction by the Arab masses that the contradiction between what is said and what is done is a normal state of affairs and this has spread the feeling of ambivalence towards Joint Arab work. The absence of any uprising in favor of pan-Arab aspirations of unity could confirm this claim.

3- The league's charter has stipulated that this Arab institution comes in response to the Arab public opinion in all Arab countries. The Arab public opinion and the reaction of the league with its aspirations will stay as a source for the league's legitimacy.

But we have to admit that there is a big mal-function in the relation between the league and the masses. Overwhelming waves of contradicting ideologies, progressive or reservist sometimes liberal, capitalist, communist and many other schools of thought have all contributed to this result. Some would feel that their loyalty to one ideology is stronger than their loyalty to the Arab identity.

- The disastrous failure of the League members to agree on the membership of the newly created Palestine government based in Gaza and the military and diplomatic debacle of the Arab states in 48-49. Arab Israeli war downsized these expectations and inaugurated a gradual process of formal and informal adaption of the league's legal features and internal procedures.

- The Joint defense Treaty assumed from the secretary general an increasingly active role in representing the interests of the Arab world in post colonial negotiations and in mediating inter-Arab disputes and in coordinating the policies of the Arab states in the UN security council but again he did not, so is it the secretary general.

Exaggerated Realism and misleading realism are two terms Dr. Hammad used when he analyzed the intellectual side of the Joint work failure [48]. We would place such terms in the morale effect of the failure of Arab Joint work under the motto of these terms, acceptance of the Israeli presence and dealing with Israel and acknowledging its domination are finding their way into Arab conscience. An element that that exacerbates this trend in the inability of the Joint Arab work to present a substitute to dealing with Israel in order to face the Arab problems.

4- The Predominance of westernization and pro-west applications especially in the cultural sphere has produced disassociation between Arab values and beliefs from one side and the Arab needs from the other side. This trend relates to the westernization in politics.

In the era of the cold war, there existed an Arab side or team that believed the solution would come through the linkage with the soviet union, versus another team that believed in the west. At a later stage one would notice that the cards or most of them went into the hands of the west namely the united states.

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[48] الدكتور مجدي حماد, (2007), جامعة الدول العربية مدخل إلى المستقبل, عالم المعرفة : الكويت ص. 42

Problems facing the league's secretariat

1- Even the limited independence of the Arab league is plagued by problems such as the attempts by the host country to control the league's secretariat and gear it to serve its interests. At the same time representatives of certain member states would interfere in the function of the league's secretariat and of other Joint work institutions, according to the bearing a certain member state would have from the financial angle or any other means that would encourage the interference [(49)].

The recruitment of staff to the secretariat based on the geographical distribution regardless of the ability, knowledge or experience has always effected the efficiency of the league's function. Another negative aspect of this recruitment policy is the problem of loyalty of the staffer and whether it should be towards the league or towards one's home state. This situation has turned the secretariat into an additional arena for display in Arab differences.

The following text will be an attempt to list some of the images of Arab work's failing pieces of Joint work. It can never constitute all the failure cases but perhaps the most prominent. It will be rather difficult to put them In the classification criterion of – for example – political, economic, social and security (or military), as these interchange most of the time and will ensure repetition

Perhaps following this display, some joint Arab work institutions would be taken as examples separately.

[(49)] الصادق شعبان, (1985) أدوار ووظائف الأمانة العامة لجامعة الدول العربية) شؤون عربية, العدد41, ص. 40-44

Some cases of Arab failure :

A pre-meditated failing charter.

1- Failure in the charter itself to secure the commitment of member states to a resolution which they have voted against. This system is bound to create resolutions clubs, that is, groups or sets of countries that belong to different resolutions [50].

2- The false enthusiasm in which resolutions by consensus are taken mostly at the time some member states are well aware that they will not implement them. One study manifested that among four thousand resolutions adopted in the period between the birth of the league and 1981, 80% were adopted by consensus, and the majority of these resolutions have not been implemented.

One has to make a correlation between the voting system that binds only countries that voted for a resolution and the phenomenon of the so many consensus based resolutions member states, to avoid clubbing into resolution groups, would find it less embarrassing to go with the consensus option, knowing that eventually they will not be bound to implement resolutions.

The re-affirmation in the charter of the concept of sovereignty of member states has weakened the concept of the greater hope of unification, along the long journey of joint work. This could have emanated from the need of some freshly independent states, and weakly legitimated states to have solid assurances of their integrity, character, sovereignty and legitimacy through the charter.

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[50] جميل مطرود ود. علي الدين الهلال, (1992), الجامعة العربية: الحاضر والمستقبل, ص 82-90

It is worthwhile to touch on the absence in the charter of the mention of any Arab bodies to deal with economic cooperation and joint defense.

The same applies on the number of ministerial councils that were established in separate (decrees) following the birth of the charter. The negative side of this practice lies in the out of control liberty in establishing new councils and unions and agencies of which mandates and jurisdictions are often overlapping and with the charter this has caused duplication in functions and interference in one body's work with another, the thing that led the league to attempt to remedy the situation through signing cooperation agreements with these independent specialized bodies.

At some stages the league tried to practice direct control over the work of these bodies, but it was met with difficulties in application mostly due to financial reasons.

As regards the duplication and overlapping, one can mention the interchange in the function of the Arab economic unity council and the economic and social council, in the science and culture area the interchange manifests in the work of the Arab organization for education, culture and science with the Arab organization for administrative studies.

And the Arab center for dry zones studies and the Arab academy for maritime transportation. There is also overlapping and duplication between the activities of the Arab economic unity council and those of the Arab organization for agricultural development, and the Arab fund for economic and social development and the Arab labor organization and the Arab monetary fund.

The Arab league has tried to overcome the problems of duplication in different ways and presented proposals to solve the problems within the document of Arab joint work strategy that was presented to Amman summit meeting of 1980.

No tangible solutions have been reached so far. And we shall visit later the treaty of joint defense and the system of peaceful settlement to Arab disputes and perhaps other inter-Arab agreements with more details.

Scenes of Arab failure :

1- Failure in presenting a complete plan for the national Arab security, a plan based on solid economic basis that can secure food and water before everything else, and secure an Arab weapons industry. This failure is attributed to the lack of Arab plan for joint development. One would recall here the 1980 Amman economic summit resolutions not with standing the importance of the resolutions, but one billion dollars were allocated to economic development, versus a hundred billion dollars allocated for the purchase of weapons that ultimately will be aimed by Arabs against other Arabs.

2- The lack of inter-Arab coordination especially in the meetings of international organizations and forums. One could refer here to the inability of having one Arab candidate to agree on in the race for UNESCO director's position.

Another example is the Arab failure due to lack of coordination to secure membership for the Arab league in the Seattle conference of 2000 on freeing International trade.

3- The Arab's trend to enter into groupings or blocks that would compete with or substitute the Arab league, such as the Islamic conference, the gulf cooperation council, the Maghreb union, the Arab cooperation council..and so forth [51].

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(51) جميل مطر, (1980), التجارب الوحدوية الوظيفية, مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية : بيروت, ص488-494

4- The failure in dealing with crucial situations and events that have the element of surprise.

Improvisation has always been the answer, the Arabs have very often been caught off-guards, and had no ready plans to face such situations.

Two examples were the signing of the camp-David agreements and the notorious visit to Israel by president Sadat, and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1989.

The Arab joint work requires long term planning in addition to short-term planning.

5- The failure in dealing with Arab states that gave priority to alliances outside joint Arab work in a number of conflicts, armed and non-armed conflicts. Between an Arab state and a non-Arab state. Examples of such situations are Iraqi's war with Iran, the invasion of Iraq by coalition powers, and the Somali-Ethiopian war.

Assessing the literature

The interpretative paradigms discussed in the previous section reflect the overwhelming consensus in the discourse on regionalism and sub-regionalism in the Middle East. However, at a closer look, the empirical bases of these claims are surprisingly weak.

Even the most recent literature on the Arab League draws almost exclusively on the comparative works of Joseph Nye and Mark Zacher [(40)].

The most recent conflicts analyzed by these studies ended, respectively, in 1967 (Second Yemen Civil War) and in 1977 (Libya-Egypt border war) . Nye's work in fact looks at only

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[(40)] Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. 'Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League', in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 283.

three interventions of the Arab League (1958 First Lebanese civil war, 1961-63 Iraq – Kuwait war on Kuwait's independence, 1975-90 Second Yemeni Civil War) and finds that the League was decisive in providing a settlement for the Kuwait crisis and contributed to the conflict-resolution process in the Lebanese civil war. Yet, while these date suggest that the rate of success of the League in settling regional conflicts (2 out of 3, or 67 percent) would be significantly higher that those of OAS (30 percent) and OAU (20 percent) , Nye bases his conclusions on a 'weighted' rate of success (created by attributing scores to the complexity and intensity of each dispute), which allegedly show that the League was in fact less effective that the other two organizations.

Zacher considers a relatively wider, yet still partial set of conflicts (17) whose selection criteria are unspecified. He adds that at least nine of these conflicts 'were not even brought to the Arab League' [41], and in various cases the League's neglect appears to be related to the fact that they were relatively minor internal unrests (e.g. Jordan's civil strife's' in 1957 and 1966).

Other major crises in which the League as heavily involved have been omitted from the analysis – including the crisis over Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic (UAR in 1961).

A quote from Ibrahim Awad's 1994 piece on regional and sub-regional organizations in the Middle East – 'the League met with success in only six of seventy-seven conflictual

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[41] Zacher, Mark. 1979. International Conflicts and Collective Security, 1949-77: The United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity, and Arab League. New York & London: Praeger P.195 .

situations it attempted to settle between 1945 and 1981' – is also often used to compensate for the absence of recent comparative studies [42].

However, Awad does not provide any reference , table or detailed discussion to substantiate his claim, being satisfied to mention this figure 'without elaborating' [43].

Research on Gulf Cooperation Council can be as erratic as the research on the Arab League. No comparative or systematic study of the effectiveness of the GCC in tackling regional conflicts has been undertaken to date. Most of the literature dealing with the GCC was in fact produced within the first ten years of life of the organization [44] when the interests in sub-regionalism in the Gulf region was high, partly as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq War and the 1990 Gulf war.

The only systematic attempts to track the role of the GCC in mediating regional conflicts have arguably been Joffe' (1997) and Schofield (1997), which trace the evolution of territorial disputes in the Gulf until the late 1990s and the role of the GCC in mediating between the disputants. No research is available for the period after 1997, and no source has so far analyzed systematically how the GCC has approached major conflicts in the region that were not related to boundary demarcation.

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(42) Barnett, Michael and Solingen, Etel. 2007. ‘Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? The sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League’, in A.I. Johnson and A. Acharya (eds), Crafting Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, P. 283.

(43) Awad, Ibrahim.1994. ‘The Future of Regional and Sub regional Organization in the Arab World’, in D. Tschirgi(ed), The Arab World Today. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 153.

(44) Harb 1986; Peterson 1988; Ramazani 1988; Guazzone 1988; Tow 1990; Twinam 1991.

Regional mediation attempts: a methodological overview :

Using Marieke Kleiboer's inclusive definition of 'international mediation' as a form of conflict management in which a third party assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force'[46]. While the term 'assist' might leave room for contrasting interpretations, simply discussing a regional crisis in the collective bodies of an organization clearly doest not amount to mediation, even if such discussions result in the adoption of a resolution .

Between 1945 and 1955 alone, the Arab League Council approved 993 resolutions, including some dealing with extra-regional conflicts in Cyprus, Spain and Kashmir[47]. For the purposes of this analysis, an episode of mediation amounts to a political decision by the organs of the organization (including the approval of a resolution), followed by recognizable mediation activity aimed at implementing the decision. Such activities will be considered as the *primary cause* of the resolution of a conflict if the evidence suggests that they have directly impacted on the resolution of a conflict or dispute, and that such impact is distinct from the mediation efforts or interventions of other third parties; they will be considered as having *contributed to success* if their impact is not fully distinguishable from those of other mediation efforts or other external events (e.g. coups or military interventions by third parties) . Discussing the development of the Arab League is something crucial when coming to evaluating the Arab League's work , I just shed some light on the important stages that has relevance to my discussion.

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(46) Kleiboer 1996: 360.

(47) Elmandjra, Mahdi Saadi. 1957. The League of Arab States, 1945-1955. Phd(Econ) Thesis, University of London, London school of Economics.P250.

Chapter Four

Analysis of the Arab state of affairs and the future potential between success and failure.

To venture in such an analysis, one has to review the causes that led to the present situation of Arab fragmentation , then the endeavors that were made to try to keep the Arab ranks consistent and promote the Arab joint work. That will be concluded with an outlook at the recent development, uprising or revolutions or movements initiated by the Arab masses as they seem to be so far.

To look into the causes of the Arab's deteriorating joint work, we tend to take the causes according to whether they are internal or external, as this division encompasses the areas in which these causes act whether political, economic, social or otherwise. We have seen in many previously mentioned parts of the research that the role of the Arab league and its staff was minimal in leading to the present state of affairs in the Arab work. It was the will or the wills of the Arab regimes and sometimes the Arab public that led us to what we are now.

Causes of Failure

1- The lack of democracy.

One can barely find a democratic Arab regime among the twenty two Arab states. If it was found in one or more, it was only to survive for a very short period of time and the either transform gradually into an autocratic democracy or be replaced by a military Junta that will usurp the power and claim that it will be there for a transitional period of time, and eventually stay there. We have witnessed this scene in many Arab countries , like Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Tunis, and other countries. It was said once that the only democracy in the Arab world but to think that everyone knows that it is a democracy based on false foundations, i.e its constitution was tailored by France the imperial power then to be dependant or religious and ethnic foundations and this is bound to fail.

One can see the turmoil it has been causing for (scores) of years in Lebanon. How the absence of democracy would affect the Arab joint work is not difficult to detect. Democracy would mean the winning of the majority's opinion, and the majority of the Arab masses favored Arab integration and that was undisputable in the fifties until the early eighties of the last century.

The eighties and after it witnessed a big difference between the incomes of people in different Arab countries. One can say that even democracy would not pave the road towards promoting the willing for unity among the nationals of certain Arab countries. This will be detailed separately.

Non-democracy breeds corruption, favoritism, poverty and the illnesses of a society. It can deter the attention of the masses from broad aspirations like unity with fellow Arabs to

much narrower problems like fighting poverty and sickness and running after means of living. Rulers in non-democratic countries know that in a wider unity they will lose their positions and that was the case in most Arab countries. An Arab league charter tailored to serve the purpose of status-quo in every Arab country.

2- The ever increasing gap between the economies of Arab countries.

This phenomenon started gradually since the birth of the league and developed by time. The trend of favoring individual country work to pan Arab work that made the features of the charter has grown dramatically along the years. That is what we meant by claiming that perhaps the majority of public opinions in certain Arab countries at present would not opt for Arab unity as this would infringe on their high incomes and prosperous lives. The per-capita income can range from one thousand dollars a year in one country to perhaps thirty thousand or more in other Arab countries.

Joint Arab work was difficult in the beginning and has grown more difficult by time.

3- The growing religious (fanatism).

Following the repeated defeats of Arab countries either jointly facing Israel in 1948 or separately in the fifties and sixties and on until the present moment, the feeling of leading the battle in the face of Israel and the supporting western powers in the name and spirit of Arab nationalism has started to fade, leaving the ground to the growing feeling of the need to resort to Islam as the cure to all the ailments of the nation. It is not my duty here to investigate how the religious feeling can work on the morale, but it was natural to see the growing numbers of people retreat to the doctrine of Jihad as the only course to victory. We have seen in the past three decades how these fanatic groups kept the Arab world and the

whole world busy and thus led to the intervention of foreign powers in the internal affairs of most if not all of Arab countries in the name of combating terrorism.

This phenomenon has bolstered the trend of Arab regimes to keep democracy away as it could mean the rule of religious parties and groups. It happened in the nineties of the past century follow in a democratic election and Algeria paid a very high price of blood shed to fight the results of the elections and prevent an Islamic regime from gaining power. It happened in Gaza also, where the Islamic party Hamas won the Palestinian elections and the result was the separation of Gaza from the national Palestinian authority in the west bank.

It is needless to mention here in elaboration why extreme Islamic regimes are not favored by the west and certain Arab powers in the context of the threat that the islamists pose to Israel.

4- The phenomenon of the growing demands of ethnic minorities in certain Arab countries. This problem has grown up in direct proportion with the growing feeling of the absence of democracy, and the gradual ability of the public opinion in the expression of its dissatisfaction and discontent. We have seen that in Egypt over the post two decades , in Bahrain , in Syria, in Sudan, in Algeria, in morocco and elsewhere in the Arab world.

5- The absence of trust in the inter-Arab dealings, the Arab world has suffered a lot from the quarrels that erupt suddenly between one or more Arab state with another Arab state or states.

6- Things could look normal between two Arab states and delegations could be coming and going from and to both countries and all of a sudden a security incident would occur in one country and the associations will be directed to another Arab country. Whether true or

not that Arab countries plot against each other, the short breath that the Arab regimes deal with the problem is shocking; mutual agreements will be abolished ; citizens of both countries would suffer the harsh treatment and persecution of the other country. All what was built will be destroyed overnight.

7- This has been witnessed between Syria and Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, Iraq and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Morocco and Algeria, Egypt and Sudan and lots of other examples. It has been widely thought in certain cases of quarrels that they could be staged whenever an Arab head of state has a certain agenda aimed at cutting the cooperation with another regime. It takes usually years for efforts of reconciliation to rebuild the trust and exchange visits of delegations and have committees of both countries to reset the kind of cooperation that was formally existing. One can imagine the impact of such practices on the joint Arab work.

External Causes :

1- The ability of the big powers to interfere in Arab affairs ever since the Arab countries gained independence from direct colonization and foreign mandates, they have been subjected to indirect interference in their affairs. As if imperialism has left through the door to come back through the window. In fact the powers that ceded to the Arab demands for independence designed the necessary plans to leave before there departure as many as they can of Arab entities, as what was done in the fragmentation of the gulf states and the countries that were the product of the Anglo-French arrangement reached by the Sikes – Picot declaration.

The western powers were able to tie most of the newly born Arab countries with treaties and economic arrangements that will make them independent for long on the previous colonialists. Gradually the British and the French handed the mission of controlling the Middle East and the Arab region to the new super power, the United states of America. Joint Arab work has been suffering as a result of the presence of two major political camps that encompassed Arab regimes for long.

One that believes in the cooperation with the united states and the west. The other camp believed that the west and the united states will never care for the well being towards backwardness and fragmentation.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union that used to back up the anti-western camp in the Arab world. The west and the united states influence grew stronger using sometimes the universal cooperation in fighting terrorism to gain more Arab regimes to cooperate and coordinate with the west.

This has added more chaos in the Joint Arab work, as Arab states degree of cooperation with the western powers has varied in strength, some would have full cooperation including military cooperation , others would confine their cooperation to lesser degrees of exchange of information and intelligence.

2- Military presence in the Middle East

It is beyond doubt that the military presence of the western powers in the area has shaken the joint Arab work strongly. Following the September II terrorist operations , the united states managed to build a wide coalition of western and eastern coalitions to combat terrorism, the coalition included Arab countries In addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan and

other Asian countries. This was coupled with the presence of coalition forces that invaded Iraq to (topple) Sadam's regime.

3- The Iraq and Gulf events.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and all the events that followed have caused the strongest blow to the joint Arab work. Dealing with the crisis in the Arab league has manifested the level of differences that the Arab states have.

Many different Arab reactions appeared, and the opinion of supporting the western troops to throw out Saddam Hussein's forces by military forces had won. We witnessed Syrian and Egyptian troops along side American and western troops to fight Iraqi troops. No one can ever imagine this scenario in the worst scenes of Joint Arab work. What followed was to kick Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, and the continued presence of the western troops in the gulf in contradiction to their pledges of leaving the area after completing their mission. This time the west staged a different reason and aim for their presence in the area, the reason was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction that the Iraqi regime had compiled. Under this pretence Iraq was invaded in 2003 and Saddam and his comrades of the regime were tried and executed.

Between 1990 and the present time, we have witnessed the worst Joint Arab work ever. This research can only point briefly to the deteriorating Joint Arab Work in view of the different stand points of different Arab states towards the degree of involvement of western powers in the arab affairs that we are living at present.

4- The dilemma of the Israeli presence.

This would need volumes of research, as the initial look upon the impact of the Israeli Arab dispute is one that logically implies more Arab consolidation facing the Israeli occupation of Arab Palestinian territories and other Arab territories in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt and Jordan before their peace treaties with Israel.

This presumption could be true in the early years that followed the birth of Israel and the exodus of nearly one million Palestinian refugees from their homeland following the 1948 Arab Israeli war. Every reason was there for the Arabs to join their efforts in spite of the exchange of accusations between the Arab countries over each state's failure and short comings in the battles that led to the defeat of the Arab armies. In the fifties the Arab world witnessed a drive for joint work motored by the scenes of suffering of the displaced Palestinians and the nationalistic emotions of the Arab masses. The Arab theatre witnessed the coup d'etat In Egypt in 1952, and a series of coups in Syria, and those two were major players in the war. The ground was fertile for the birth of parties all through the nation, the Baath party, the Arab nationalist movement or party (Alqawmeyeen Al Arab) the Tahreer or liberation party, the communist party, the Muslim brotherhood found its way through the Arab world emanating from Egypt much earlier that the fifties. A lot of local smaller parties rose in different Arab countries. The fifties was the golden age for the party based and organized work, and most if not all of the parties called for Arab integration and unity. Regimes of that era could only relatively respond to the public opinion pressure. But the developments that followed, and the series of battles and wars with Israel, generated results that would reverse the rising tide of pan-national work, and it has been declining ever since. The western powers used Israel as their tall arm to serve their purposes of keeping the area

in turmoil, and deflating its resources in failed battles, until they found the right time for their direct involvement to carry out their plans.

The ultimate impact of the reversal in the Israeli factor was the penetration that Israel and the west succeeded in achieving, and that was the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel. That opened the door wide for more distortion of Joint Arab work, as the Palestinians adopted the option for peace with Israel, and the Jordanian Israeli peace treaty, in addition to other Arab countries taking steps towards the normalization of relations with Israel.

Endeavors to promote Arab Joint Work

The rule of summits

It seems that most of the attempts to promote Joint Arab work came in the context of the Arab summit meetings. It is worthwhile to point out that the summit meetings, since the birth of the league until the end of the past century, used to be held irregularly and in emergencies. there used to be no regular time span for the summit meetings. That means that they will hold for crucial matters following some consultation between major Arab players. The summit meetings were the best opportunity for Arab leaders to propose steps at the highest level to promote Joint work. In this context it is safe to consider the summit as platform as a new body that functions in the frame of the Arab league, the resolutions of which are an addition sometimes to the charter itself, when the summit decides on new or additional bodies and mechanisms to promote Joint Arab work. Thus the summit played an important role in the promotion of Joint work through what came to be described as implicit amendments of the charter in the matter that we mentioned.

Although the first actual summit was held in Inshass-Egypt in may 1946, the first official summit was held in Cairo in 1964 as the first summit of 1946 was held as an Arab league regular meeting.

The attempts on improving the Arab work started in the 1964 summit, where a resolution was taken to hold summit meetings on yearly basis, but this resolution waited 36 years to be incorporated in an annex to the charter at the Cairo summit of 2000. Between 1964 and 2000 many attempts were made to promote Joint Arab work through the summits that took place.

The promotion attempts aimed at the establishment of new institutions like an Arab court of justice and a mechanism for conflict resolution, and the discussion of a Libyan suggestion of the establishment of an Arab union.

Promotion attempts also aimed at developing the organizational work of the general secretariat, at a certain stage this was linked with the attempts to amend the charter. But one significant reference in this regard was the summit of Rabat of 1974, where the summit entrusted a quadruple committee to prepare a study report on developing the league to be submitted to the eighth summit, and that did not happen. The Tunis summit of 1979 called for the reconstruction of the league's working organs on a new basis that would guarantee the efficiency and ability to move, then the Casa Blanca summit of 1989 mentioned in its final statement the necessity of developing the administrative organization and structure of the league. No further reference has been made after the Casa Blanca until the Amman summit of 2001.

Attempts to fix the specialized organizations

There were also attempts on the promotion of the work of the existing Arab specialized organizations. The subject was raised once in the Amman summit of 1987, following the concerns over the collapse of these organizations due the abstainment of a number of states from paying their financial duties in the budgets of the organizations and the withdrawal of some member states. Amman summit called on the Arab states to settle their dues to the organizations budgets, and called on states to freeze their withdrawal pending the results of the eight member committee that the economic and social council formed in 1989. Based on

this report the council issued a resolution recommending cutting short the number of organizations and the abstainment from establishing new ones. Late development have proven the presence of adverse reactions to the function of these organizations especially in the aftermath of the gulf crisis of 1990, after which these organizations have been facing big financial impediments.

It is worth to mention that the establishment of the specialized organizations was not in the charter itself but the charter has entrusted the secretary general to recommend the establishment of the organization that he finds necessary. The aim was to avoid the political nature of the league itself, and the continued rows between Arab states. Their number has grown to reach around twenty of them. The concept of their presence is noble, but on the ground there have been some repercussions of their presence.

As to the question of their independence from the league and the overlapping and duplication in their functions.

It was mentioned earlier in this research that the Arab league has tried to initiate cooperation agreements with a number of these organizations to regulate the relationship between them and the league. On some of them the league has tried to apply direct control using the financial dimension.

As for the duplication, one can find for example an overlap between the function of Arab economic unity council, and the economic and social council, the work of the Arab organization for education, culture and science, and the work of the Arab organization for administration studies. There are many examples of the like.

Attempts to develop the charter

The question that always arises whether the charter has been an obstacle in the way of Joint Arab work or the joint Arab work as it was intended made the charter the way it is. In more than one place in this research we have discussed the trends that geared the charter's structure, and those were the trend of singular country work, and the trend of collective pan-Arab work, so amending the charter equals the will to change the politically motivated attitudes of Arab states towards Joint work.

Implicit Amendments

One has in this context to look at whether the charter to be amended is the one that was worded in 1945, or the charter that the whole experience of Arab work has melted with, and that involves all the Arab organizations and unions and councils that were established with or after the charter, and all the summit resolutions that added to the chartered work implicitly. One has to refer to item (19) of the charter that reads : (it is possible with the approval of two thirds of the member-states to amend this charter, especially in strengthening the ties between member states, and in the aim of establishing an Arab court of justice and coordinate the relations of the league with other international institutes that might rise in the future to maintain peace and security) [52]

This means that the will for amendment exists in form and this is what led to the enrichment of the charter indirectly as mentioned earlier. Item (9) in the charter encouraged developing ties between Arab states outside the umbrella of the league by welcoming joint

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[52] كلية الحقوق والعلون الإنسانية, مسألة تعديل ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية, (1981), مركز الدراسات والبحوث والنشر: تونس , ص 281

cooperation between two Arab states or more through agreements that will not jeopardize the commitments of the states within the Arab league.

These mechanisms for promoting Arab work achieved limited success as for example the efforts to establish the court of justice started in Alexandria summit of 1964 and failed in spite of all the studies and academic researches in preparation to the court.

Dr. Hammad referred in page 220 to the constructive un clarity of the charter in the sense that the adoption of the least possible (the minimum) in wording the charter in 1945 had the bright side of the ability of the roles of the charter for amendment. For instance the unanimity of vote needed for the admittance of a new member was decoded to a unanimity of the states attending the league's meeting, in the case of Iraq's withdrawal from the meeting upon the admittance of Kuwait as a member of the league in 1961. This new rule developed by practice to be the need of the majority instead of unanimity for admitting new members, and that was the case for admitting UAE, and the Comarro islands and Oman latuon, and the same rule was applied in the suspension of Egypt's membership in 1979.

Direct amendments

In spite of the many drafts for amending the charter directly, the only direct amendment were two formal ones:

- One amendment in 1958 that contained changing the regular session of October to September and the second was the amendment of the annex related to Palestine. An Arab league resolutions was issued in September 1976 to admit Palestine as a full member.

After we have examined the unwritten amendments that were accepted through practice as they do not go against the charter, and the written two formal amendments of the charter, it is necessary to touch on the history of the projects aimed at the amendments of the charter.

Major unconcluded plans for amending the charter

We have to say at the outset that these major plans did not find their way to application.

They started in 1979 in resolution 3843 of the league's session of June 1979 that called upon member states to provide the general secretariat within two months with their proposals around the consolidation of Joint work, and on the amendment of the charter and the league's internal system of work organization. The proposals will be then submitted by the secretary general to the regular session in march 1980.

The substance of this motion implies that what is aimed at is a new charter, but in fact it was meant that what is sought for was major comprehensive amendments that could melt with the 1945 charter.

In November 1979, Resolution No.7 of the Tunis summit confirmed the need for urgency in amending the league to boost the joint work and rebuild the league's institutions on fresh basis that will guarantee the efficiency and mobility of the Arab work and aim at the achievement of Arab unity[53].

The motion or the trend took an institutional form as from 1980, when the league's session adopted resolution no.3931 in march 1980 to form a general committee that includes experts of all member states to study the plan of amending the charter.

This committee held 35 working sessions in 1982 and adopted a draft amendment to be presented to the next summit meeting.

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[53] مسألة تعديل ميثاق جامعة الدول العربية, مصدر سابق, ص 202

Freeing the amendment

In September 1982 the 12th summit in fez-morocco resolute that a committee of six foreign ministers of chosen states shall meet to find reconciliation forms to the draft amendment. The committee was constituted of ministers from Tunis, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and morocco. The ministerial committee held a number of meetings between 1983 and 1984 and presented some proposals on the matters of disagreement.

In may 1989 the emergency summit of Casablanca decided the reconsideration of the draft amendment, and added Egypt to the membership of the committee. Two factors imported on the decision to restudy the project. One was the emergence of some Arab cooperation regional groups like the (the Arab cooperation council) and (gulf cooperation council), the thing that opened the door to draw the lines of cooperation with these new groupings in the draft amendment. The second factor was the re-admittance of Egypt to the league, which necessitated for Egypt to put in the amendment its ideas and suggestions.

Thus the return of Egypt as decided in the Casablanca summit of 1989 dealt a blow to the amendment project, as Egypt submitted proposals in 1990 that would go in the direction of leaving the 1945 charter as it is, and if necessary add annexes to it on the matters in mind. That was based on the principle that what was wanted was developing the charter, and not building a new one. Egypt had in mind two points :

- One was the experience of having been suspended from the league and the other was the new dimension of its peace treaty with Israel, which has put certain commitments on Egypt towards Israel and the need for negotiations to reach peace, which means distancing itself from the ultimate goal of pan-Arab nationalism and Arab unity. As a result the general

secretariat of the league prepared two drafts for amendments in 1990 : one was according to the course taken since 1982 of a major amendment and the other was according to the Egyptian proposals.

- The continued postponements later, and the lack of majority on either draft brought the subject of amendment to an impasse. Some new attempts later emerged following the invasion of Iraq by coalition forces in 203 and had the same fate as the previous attempts.

A quick look at recent developments in the Arab scene

We are living in an unprecedented Arab state of affairs now, as we had witnessed two revolutions that took place in Tunis and Egypt in the span of two months early this year, what distinguishes these two big changes is the motoring power of the revolution.

It was the masses this time that took to the streets and numbered in millions and were able to dictate their collective demands of changing the regimes and ousting the leaders of the regimes and bringing them and their government officials to trial. A scene that had not been witnessed before. What the Arab scene had before was coups organized and implemented by the military.

The syndrome of masses in the street very soon transmitted to other Arab countries in different degrees of strength, Bahrain , Syria, Yemen, Lybia, and elsewhere.

Although the uprisings in Lybia, Syria and Yemen have not precipitated yet, but one can notice the insistence by the masses on bringing the regimes down. It is difficult to forecast the results as yet, but everyone is watching the stubbornness of the leaders of these regimes in clinging to power.

But the heavy tolls of casualties in the violence that is going on adds to the culpability of the symbols of these regimes, which means more stubbornness and holding to the position of either side in the violence.

The Future

What interest us in the research is to look at the engine or the source that powered the uprisings.

We do not mean the external influence of certain countries whether in the middle east area or in the west, as this could not be proven until later in time, years maybe are needed to find out. But a look at the slogans and the demands can give us the preliminary impression that what the masses are after is the elimination of corruption, the improvement of the living of the people, more say to the masses in running their own affairs meaning democracy. We have not seen slogans calling for Arab consolidation and pan-Arab nationalistic calls and slogans.

This could lead to the conclusion that the worries of Arab masses, and their concerns have tilted from Arab nationalism to local country confined demands.

This could be analyzed later as a result of failing Arab work throughout the past decades. But conclude to say that only time can reveal what is lying ahead in this very crucial period that the Arab joint work is living.

Chapter Five

Conclusion and Recommendations

Evaluating the Arab League in generating Joint Arab Work was a real dilemma, especially when it came to the question : should it be evaluated then according to what ?

As a regional organization ? Even though the League does not fall neatly in any of the international systems postulated by Morton Kaplan the author of (System and Process in International Systems) mentioning that it might closely resemble the non directive universal international systems since it relies on democratic decision making processes.

Or it should be evaluated according to its charter, even though the charter sets it as a least denominator organization ? and Michael Barnett and Etel Solingen debated in their masterpiece of 2007 (Designed to fail or Failure of design) that the whole debacle of the Arab League was on purpose designed to fail, arguing that certain politics of Arab Nationalism and a shared identity led the six founding states to embrace Arab unity at that time to legitimize their regimes while they fear it in practice because it would impose greater restrictions on their sovereignty.

Or it should be evaluated according to the Arab Masses aspirations of an Arab federation or confederation ?

The League was dealt with like the study stated in previous chapters for the purposes of this study as a regional organization and it was judged accordingly.

While there are two approaches to a regional organization :

- Regionalism as an approach to International Security where International cooperation in the field of politics is achieved.
- Or Functional Integration where International Cooperation in the fields of Economics, Education, science and etc.

This Study with 30 Examples of unconcluded plans, unimplemented resolutions, and Failed Arab Joint Work Attempts concluded that the League failed to achieve any of the two approaches attempts.

Further More this Study tackled the reasons behind the failure of the League that dominated most of its work, and suggested the following :

- Any attempt to apply regionalism and political unity will lead to a disastrous failure, taking into account the Status-Quo of the Arab countries and their highly foreign dependency and this issue was detailed in previous chapters of the study.

- Any attempt to amend the charter will lead to the same result arguing that the charter of the league for the past six decades was not the basis nor the reference for the Arab League's work, in fact if we had the charter as a basis of evaluation then we will have a successful league to praise and cherish, not to mention that there was the first unwritten amendment to the charter in 1970, when the Arab states decided to sign the treaty of Joint

Defense and Economic cooperation and what were the results of that treaty on the ground? Nothing worth mentioning. So the charter can be amended as much as the crouds desire but no true outcomes will be delivered on the ground and this approach will always lack the political will from the Arab countries.

- The only thing the Arab League has the best hope in serving Arab Unity in the future is through the economic field, but the riddle in this approach also like the study concluded is also any attempt to apply Functional Integration as an approach to cooperation between the Arab States in the fields of economic, science, health, education and so forth taking into account current status of the Arab region will also lead to a disastrous failure, to explain more; even though functional Integration was the method applied to establish the Economic European community but the Arab world lacks the interdependence that characterized Europe for fifty years or more before the establishment of the European economic community, also the sectoral imbalances that emphasize agricultural raw materials, unprocessed minerals and petroleum will continue to tie the area to distant commodity centers. Also the lack of efficient regional transportation and communication networks will continue to hamper the development of internal markets, and these after all are the basic requirements for a basic integration scheme.

The study suggests No dead end is suggested in this study on the contrary it emphasizes and recommends the following :

- The focus on building the foundation of a gradual integration scheme at first between the Arab countries by creating inter Arab dependency in all fields and this can be achieved by implementing projects and cooperation plans on a small scale.

And the forums the Arab League held are very successful in gathering Arab Professionals in different fields and can be in a very successful way the reason of the adoption of many small scale projects, and many codes in many fields of governmental work, thus leading to coordinated Joint Arab Work, and this leads to the next recommendation which is very crucial to complement the previous and that is :

- The creation of a successful (Follow Up) mechanism, this is what the study suggests is needed, since any big change or big suggested solutions and amendments will scare off the decision makers, it is interesting to mention that the Japanese call this gradual development and change, this will eventually lead to the development of a regional market, and building the foundation of interdependence between Arab countries, thus seeking to implement the second approach which is functional Integration.

- Another item this study recommends relates to Arab Nationalism, And it is very well known that there are two approaches :

1- The supporters of Pan – Arab nationalist work.

2- And The supporters of the local home – country nationalist work.

The same idea in the opinion of this research has suffered a serious decline in its supporters and believers and this was mentioned earlier when recent developments in the

Arab region were mentioned, since no slogans from Arab masses in their revolutions asked for the Arab Unity or even mentioned it.

The Arab League should address this issue seriously since the support that it should seeks is not the support of the Arab governments and leaders, but the support of the Arab masses and especially in the meanwhile.

Thus the study strongly recommends the creation of a department of sociologists in the Arab league to figure out ways to promote for the original idea, the basis that everything should be built on, which is Arab Nationalism.

The public opinion of the Arab masses is a hot spot, a clever administration of the League should start from.

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APPENDIX A : THE ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL

The chiefs and members of the Syrian, Trans-Jordanian, Iraqi, Lebanese and Egyptian delegations at the Prelimi-nary Committee of the General Arab Conference,

Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations,

And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,

Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8,1363 (Sep-tember 25,1944), in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference, and have agreed as follows :

1. LEADE OF ARAB STATES :

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which consent to join the league. It will have a council which will be known as the "Council of the League of Arab States", in which all participating states will be represented on an equal footing.

The object of the League will be to control the execution of the agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate their political plans to as to insure their cooperation, and protect their independence and sovereignty against every aggression by suitable means ; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interest of the Arab countries.

The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two member states of the League in which

the two parties shall refer their dispute to the Council for solution. In this case the decision of the Council of the League will be binging.

In no case will resort to force to settle a dispute between any two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of the present dispositions.

In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.

The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile them.

A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab States.

2. COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER MATTERS:

A. The Arab States presented to the Preliminary Committee shall closely cooperate in the following maters:

(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchanges, customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.

(2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs.

(3) Cultural matters.

(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgment, extradition of criminals, etc.

(5) Social questions.

(6) Questions of public health.

B. A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary Committee will be represented . This subcommittee will prepare draft regulations for cooperation in the above matters, describing the extent and means of that collaboration.

C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose object will be to control the work of the other subcommittees, to coordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.

D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work the Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittee as a preliminary step toward the holding of a General Arab Conference.

3. CONSOLIDATION OF THESE TIES IN THE FUTURE

While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to consolidate that step by other steps, especially if postwar events should result in institutions which bind various Powers more closely together.

4. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING LEBANON

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of October7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies.

5. A SPECIAL RESOLUTION CONCERNING PALESTINE

A. The Committee if of the opinion that Palestine const-itutes an important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World.

The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab Lands, and the achievements of independence for Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.

The committee declares its support of the cause of the Arab of Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aim and the safeguarding of their just rights.

The Committee also declares that is second to none in regretting the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater

injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and deno-minations.

B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and to submit the results of the examination to the Preliminary Committee in its next meeting .

In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).

APPENDIX B: PACT OF THE LEAGUE ARAB STATES':

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC ;

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF TRANS-JORDAN;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA;

HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC;

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT;

HIS MAHESTY THE KING OF YEMEN.

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states.

And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the Independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes;

And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab lands;

Having agreed to conclude a Pact to the end and having appointed as their representatives the persons whose names are listed hereinafter, have agreed upon a following provisions:

Article 1 : The League of Arab States is composed of the Independent Arab States which have signed this Pact.

Any Independent Arab states has the right to become a member of the League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request.

Article 2: The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their Independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to the organization and circumstances of the each states, on the following matters:

A: Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations, customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry .

B: Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation, navigation, telegraphs, and post.

C: Cultural affairs.

D: nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and extradition of criminals.

E: Social affairs.

F: Health problems.

Article 3: The League shall possess a Council composed of the representatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.

It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agreements which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated in the preceding article, or on any other questions.

It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and regulate economic and social relations.

Article 4: For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be set up a special committee in which the member states of the League shall be represented. These committee shall be charged with the task of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation. Such principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the aforesaid states.

Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to participate and the rules governing such representation.

Article 5 : Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. It there should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and obligatory.

In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.

Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by majority vote.

Article 6: In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.

The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression. If the aggressor is a member state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.

If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the foregoing paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

Article 7 : Unanimous decision of the Council shall be binding upon all member state of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only upon those states which have accepted them.

In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in each member state according to its respective basic laws.

Article 8: Each member state shall respect the systems of government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government.

Article 9 : States of the League which desire to establish closer cooperation and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude agreements to that end.

Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding or restrictive upon other members.

Article 10: The permanent seat of the league of Arab States is established in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place it may designate.

Article 11: The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session twice a year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary session upon the request of two member state of the League whenever the need arises.

Article 12 : The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretariat, and an appropriate number of officials.

The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a majority of two-thirds of the states of the League. The Secretary-General, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.

The Council of the League shall establish an administrative regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters relating to the staff.

The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

Article 13: The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before the beginning of each fiscal year.

Article 14: The members of the Council of the League as well as the members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.

The building occupied by the organs of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 15: The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.

The representatives of the member states of the League shall alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary sessions.

Article 16: Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a majority vote of the Council shall be sufficient to make enforceable decisions on the following matters:

Matters relating to personnel.

A. Adoption of the budget of the League.

B. Establishment of the administrative regulation for Council, the committee, and the Secretariat-General.

C. Decisions to adjourn the session.

Article 17 : Each member state of the League shall deposit with the Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded in the future between itself and another member state of the League or a third state.

Article 18: If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League, it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such withdrawal is to go into effect.

The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned.

Article 19 : This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab Tribunal of Arbitration , and to regulate the relations of the League with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee security and peace.

Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session following the session in which the motion was initiated.

If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20: This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with The Secretariat- General of the Council and the pact shall become operative as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the Secretary-General has received the instruments of ratification from four states.

This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22, 1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safekeeping of the Secretariat-General .

An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.

(Here follow the signatures)

(1) Annex Regarding Palestine

Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned.

However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.

Her international existence and independence in the legal sense cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence of the other Arab countries.

Although the outward manifestations of this independence have remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council of the League.

The states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine and until that country can effectively exercise its independence the Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) *Annex Regarding Cooperation with Countries which are not members of the Council of the League:*

Whereas the member state of the League will have to deal in the Council as well as in the committees with maters which will benefit and affect the Arab world at large;

And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to work toward their realization;

Now, therefore, it particularly, behooves the states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when considering the admission of those countries to participation in the committees referred in the Pact, that it should spare no effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding of their future with all the political means at its disposal.

(3) *Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary General of the League:*

The state signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His Excellency Abdul-Rahman Azzam Bey, to be Secretary –General of the League of Arab states.

This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretary-general.

APPENDIX C : JOINT DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION TREATY

BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

The Government of :

THE HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC

THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ

THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC

THE KINGDOM OF EGYPT

THE MOTAWAKILITE KINGDOM OF YEMEN

In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consolidate relations between the states of the Arab League; to maintain their independence and their mutual heritage; in accordance with the desire of their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter, together with the aims of the said pacts; and to consolidate stability and security and provide means of welfare and development in the countries.

The following government delegates of ….., having been duly accredited and fully authorized by their respective governments, approve the following:

Article 1: The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other Powers.

Article 2: The Contracting States consider any (act of) armed aggression made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all.

Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense, individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all

steps available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.

Article 3: At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty the Contracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence, or security of any one of the parties is threatened. In the even of the threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and defensive measure, as the situation may demand.

Article 4: The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above obligations and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of defense to repulse the said armed aggression.

Article 5: A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed to draw up plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of the Permanent Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of cooperation and participation mentioned in Article 4. The Permanent Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defense Council , provided hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province.

Article 6: A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of Articles 2,3,4, and 5, of this Treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5. The Joint Defense Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States.

Article 7: The Contracting States, in order to fulfill the aims of this Treaty, and to bring security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and in an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate in the development of their economies and the exploitation of their natural resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and industrial products, and generally to organize and coordinate their economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements to realize such aims.

Article 8: An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed by the Contracting States to

submit recommendations for the realization of all such aims as are set forth in the performance of its duties, seek the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs referred to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.

Article 9 : The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and indivisible part of it.

Article 10: The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty, nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty.

Article 11: No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is intended to affect, any of the rights or obligations developing upon the Contracting States from the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security .

Article 12: After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification of this Treaty, any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it, providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General of the Arab League. The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform the other Contracting States of such notice.

Article 13: This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State according to the constitutional procedure of its own government. The Treaty shall come into force for the ratifying States 15 days after the receipt by the Secretariat-General of the instruments of ratification from at least four states. This Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on April 13, 1950. One signed copy shall be deposited with the Secretariat-General of the Arab League equally authentic copies shall be transmitted to each of the Contracting States.

MILITARY ANNEX:

1 . The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of the Arab League, shall undertake the following:

(a) in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans to deal with all anticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be launched against one or more of the Contracting States or their armed forces, such plans to be based n the principles determined by the Joint Defense Council;

(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the Contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance with military exigencies and the potentialities of each state;

(c) to submit proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the Contracting States in so far as their equipment, organization, and training are concerned; so that they may keep peace with modern military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination of all such forces;

(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural agricultural, industrial, and other resources of all Contracting States in favor of the inter-Arab military effort and joint defense;

(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the Contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military exercises and maneuvers and the study of their results, recommendations for the improvement of methods to ensure close cooperation in the field, and for the general improvement of the forces of all the Contracting States;

(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military potentialities of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played by the forces of each in the joint military effort;

(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each of the Contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty, might be asked to provide, during a state of war, no behalf of the armies of such other Contracting States as might be operating on its territory.

2 . The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or permanent subcommittees from among its own members to deal with any of the matters falling

within its jurisdiction. It may also seek the advice of any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.

3 . The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports on the results of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council provided for in Article 6 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.

4 . The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its headquarters in Cairo but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years; he may be reelected . Candidates for the Chairmanship shall hold at least the rank of a high commanding officer. Each member of the Commission must have as his original nationality that of the Contracting State he represents.

5 . In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces shall be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military force taking actual part in field operation, unless, by unanimous agreement, the Commander-in-chief shall be assisted in directing military operations by a Joint Staff.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTCOL TO THE TREATY OF JOINT DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND TO THE MILITARY ANNEX

A consultative military organization shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the Contracting States to supervise the Permanent Military Commission provided by Article 5 of the Treaty and to direct it in all the functions specified in Article 1 of the Military Annex.

The reports and proposals of the Permanent Military Commission shall be submitted to the Consultative Military Organization before submitting them to the Joint Defense Council provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty.

The Consultative Military Organization shall submit its reports and proposals regarding its functions to the Joint Defense Council that it may examine them and take the necessary decisions.

The present Protocol shall have the same force as the Treaty and its Appendix {military Annex} as regards the provisions of Article 5 and 6 of the Treaty and Article 3 of the Military Appendix {Annex}.

Appendix D

Background on Arab League's attempts, approaches and initiatives in Collective Arab Work and theoretical debates on the 'failure' and 'success' of the League.

Economical organizations

- Arab Monetary Fund
- Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
- Arab organization for industrialization
- Arabic industrial development and mining organization
- Council of Arab Economic Unity
- Greater Arab Free Trade Area
- Arab Union for Cement and Building Materials
- Arab Organization for Agricultural Development[3]

Cultural organizations

- Pan Arab Games
- UAFA
- Arab States Broadcasting Union[4]
- Arab Chess Federation
- Arab Union for Youth Institutes[5]
- General Union of Arab Chambers

Scientific organizations

- Arab Union for Astronomy and Space Sciences

Political organizations

- Arab Parliament
- Arab Inter-parliamentary Union

Unions

1- Arab Union for Land Transport
2- Arab Sea Ports Federation
3- Arab Union of Arab Chambers of Shipping
4- Arab Federation for Engineering industries
5- General Union of chambers of commerce, Industry and Agriculture for Arab countries.
6- General Arab Insurance Union.
7- Arab Federation of Fish Producers.

The Council of Arab Economic Unity

The Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) was established[1] by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Syria, United Arab Emiratesand Yemen on 3 June 1957. It became effective 30 May 1964, with the ultimate goal of achieving complete economic unity among its member states.

Objectives:

- To formulate regulations, legislations, and tariffs, aiming at the creation of a unified Arab custom area.
- To co-ordinate foreign trade policies with a view to ensuring the co-ordination of the region's economy vis-à-vis world economy.
- To co-ordinate economic development and formulate programs for the attainment of joint Arab development project.
- To co-ordinate policies related to agriculture, industry, and internal trade.
- To co-ordinate financial and monetary policies with the aim of achieving monetary unity.
- To co-ordinate legislations for taxes and duties.
- To formulate unified regulations for transport and transit in the contracting countries.
- To draft common legislations on labour and social security.
- To prepare a budget for the CAEU council and its affiliated bodies.

Agadir Agreement

The Agadir Agreement for the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean Nations was signed in Rabat, Morocco on 25 February 2004.[2] The agreement aimed at establishing a free trade area between Jordan, Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco and it was seen as a possible first step in the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area as envisaged in the Barcelona Process.[3] All members of the Agadir Agreement have since joined the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, effectively superseding the agreement.

Greater Arab Free Trade Area.

The *Greater Arab Free Trade Area* (GAFTA) is a pan-Arab free trade area that came into existence in 1997. It was founded by 14 countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates) [4][5]. The establishment of GAFTA followed the adoption of the *Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Trade Among Arab Countries* (1981) by the Arab League's Economic and Social Council (ESC) and the approval by 17 Arab League member-states at a summit in Amman, Jordan of the *Greater Arab Free Trade Area Agreement* (1997). In 2009, Algeria joined GAFTA as the eighteenth member-state. GAFTA is supervised and run by the ESC. GAFTA has a high income, population, and area and has significant resources available.[6]

The members participate in 96% of the total internal Arab trade, and 95% with the rest of the world by applying the following conditions:

1. Instruct the inter-customs fees:

To reduce the Customs on Arab products by 10% annually, the 14 Arab states reported their custom tariff programs to the Security Council of the Arab League to coordinate them with each others, except for Syria that is still using the Brussels tariffs system.

2. Applying the locality of the Arab products:

All members have shared their standards and specifications to help their products move smoothly from one country to another.

The League also created a project to apply the Arab Agriculture Pact:

which is to share the standards of the agricultural sector and inject several more restrictions and specifications where all members have involved in them.

The Arab League granted exceptions, which allow a customs rate for certain goods, to six members for several goods, however rejected requests by Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan for additional exceptions.

3. Private sectors:

The League created a database and a service to inform and promote for the private's sectors benefits, and how their work would be in the GAFTA treaty is needed.

4. Communication:

The Economic and Social Council in its sixty-fifth meeting agreed on pointing a base for communication to ease communication between member states, and also to work to ease communication between the Private and public sectors to apply the Greater Arab Free Trade Area between members.

5. Customs Duties:

In the sixty-seventh meeting the Economic and Social Council agreed that the 40% decrease on customs on goods in the past 4 years of the GAFTA will continue and following the decisions of the Amman summit, the members will put more efforts to eliminate all customs duties on local Arab goods.

*The **Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development**.*

The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) is a Kuwait-based, pan-Arab development finance institution. All member-states of the Arab League are members of the AFESD. As of 2003, it held around USD 7.3 billion in assets.

The AFESD was established by agreement of the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League. Its first meeting was held on 6 February 1972.

The current Chairman is Abdulatif Y Al-Hamad.

Former Chairman is Mohammed Al Emadi.

Founding Chairman is Saeb N Jaroudi.

the establishment of the *Economic Council* of the Arab League under the terms of the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty (1950) was the fulfilment of the promise made in articles II and IV of the Arab League's Charter (1945), which required the establishment of a council to co-ordinate close co-operation of member-states in economic affairs.[3]

The *Economic Council* was renamed the *Economic and Social Council* in 1980.[4]

The ESC continues to administer the Greater Arab Free Trade Area and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, as well as supervising the Council of Arab Economic Unity and other subsidiaryinstitutions.

Arab Economic and Social Development summits

The *Arab Economic and Social Development summits* (Arabic: القمم العربية الاقتصادية والتنموية والاجتماعية) are summits of the Arab League, held at the head of state level to address issues of economic and social development among member-states. The inaugural summit was held in 2009 in Kuwait, and the second summit is planned to be held in Egypt in 2011.

Background

On 29 March 2007, resolution 365, proposed by Egypt and Kuwait and calling for a summit to address exclusively the economic and social development issues facing the Arab world, was passed at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[5]

In June 2007, the secretary-general of the Arab League convened an extraordinary session of the ESC, which had been tasked with organising the summit under the terms of resolution 365, and it was agreed that the responsibility of preparing for the first summit would fall to a preparatory committee, consisting of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, the chair of the ESC for the time being, and the two member-states that had proposed resolution 365, Egypt and Kuwait.[5]

In October 2007, the secretary-general appointed Egyptian ambassador Mervat Tellawi the co-ordinator-general for the upcoming summit and established a management committee within the framework of the general secretariat of the Arab League, later renamed the *Development Summit Management Committee*, that included

the newly-appointed co-ordinator-general, Mervat Tellawi, and various assistant secretaries-general of the Arab League.[5]

The summit was conceived as an opportunity to involve the private sector, and preparatory meetings were held by the Development Summit Management Committee with, *inter alia*, theArab Banks Federation (November 2007), the General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for Arab Countries (December 2007) and the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the Arab Parliament (May 2008).[5]

By the 2008 Arab League summit in Damascus, Syria, advanced progress had been reported by the preparatory committee to the eighty-first session of the ESC, and having received an offer to host the summit from the emir of Kuwait, USD 2 million was approved by the Arab League for financing.[5]

2009 summit

On 19–20 January 2009, the first Arab Economic and Social Development Summit was duly held in Kuwait.[6] Coming almost immediately after the Gaza War, the Arab media praised the summit for its success in reconciling the Arab world,[7] and various resolutions were passed "in solidarity with Gaza".[8] Among the other resolutions passed, there was a call for adopting necessary measures to establish an Arab customs union as of 2010, to be fully operational by 2015, to ultimately establish an Arab common market.[8]

2011 summit

Leaving the 2009 summit, Ahmed Nazif, the former Egyptian prime minister, announced that Egypt would hold the next summit in 2011.[9] Among the issues to be discussed is the proposed *Arab Plan of Action for Science and Technology*, adopted at the 2009 summit, the implementation of which is being led by UNESCO and its Arab equivalent, the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO).[10]

Arab Monetary Fund

The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) is a regional Arab organization, founded 1976, and operational from 1977. It is a working sub-organization of the Arab League.

Objectives:

The Arab Monetary Fund's main objectives are to correct and balance the payment of its member states, remove payment restrictions between members, improve Arab monetary cooperation, encourage the development of Arab financial markets (paving the way for a unified Arab currency), and to facilitate and promote trade between member states.

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The AMF's headquarters are in the city of Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates.

Arab Union for Land Transport

1. AULT participated, within the Arab States League , to modify and update the multilateral Arab Cross–Border freight (Transit) Agreement signed between Arab countries in 1977 .
2. In the same context, AULT was approached by Ministers of Transport Council to draft a multilateral Arab agreement for the movements of passengers between Arab countries. The proposed draft agreement, after being prepared by AULT, will be viewed/ amended and endorsed by the previously mentioned council in its forthcoming meeting .
3. Upon the request of Arab States League, AULT has prepared a comprehensive questionnaire about road safety which will constitute the core for a data bank in this field .
4. AULT has introduced a map of major road–networks in the Arab countries including a directory of distances between all Arab countries capitals and main cities (154 city & town).

5. AULT has recently prepared a study about economical globalization and its impact on the land transport sector in the Arab countries.
6. AULT continues the publication of its magazine " Arab Land Transport " .
7. Plans are underway presently to create and design special training courses in the flied of road transport to the staff of Ault's members.

AULT is a member at :-

1. Observer member at the Ministers of Transport Council.
2. Observer member at the Arab Ministers Of Tourism Council .

3. Member of the Arab Technical Land Transport Committee .
4. Member of the International Association Of Public Transport UITP / Belgium .

AULT Membership:-

Ault's membership is available to :-

1 Governments institutions overlooking the land transport. e.g: Ministry of transport .

2 Companies, public or private, working in land transport , whether freight or passengers.

3 Companies and / or factories working in the production of or services that are complementary to the industry, e.g: busses manufactories and forwarding companies.

AULT Governing Bodies :-

1. The General Assembly :

All working, associate and observer members. It consists presently of 54 members and meets annually.

2. The Board of Directors:

Elected by the General Assembly , 22 members of all represented countries .and it meet twice a year .

Chairman of the Board is Mr. Khalid Alnamlah, President and Director General of United Technology For Trading / Saudia Arabia .

Vice Chairman for Passengers Transport's is General Dr. Mansour Al- Halabawi Member of Board Directors for Land Transport / Holding Company For maritime and Land Transport

3. Vice Chairman for Goods Transport is Mr Hassan Sa'ad, Director of the Principal Organ for Goods Transport Regulation in Damascus and suburbs

Signing the Cooperation Agreement Between IRU (International Road Transport Union /Switzerland) and AULT(Arab Union of Land Transport)

Arab Sea Ports Federation

Arab Sea Ports Federation Objectives:

- Developing, improving and coordinating members' work fields, strengthen the relationships between them and participating in achieving the economic integration among the Arab States, through practicing its mission, specialties and expertise in Arab Sea Ports Facility.
- To be a general framework through which coordinating is attained between existing Arab Regional Port Unions or those established in the future.

For the sake of achieving these objectives, the federation is working on:

- Offering aid and support for its members in the following fields:
  - Developing and advancing the means of work to achieve best economic returns and expertise exchange between members for this purpose.

- o Obtaining the advanced modern technology and joining the members' efforts to provide the best conditions and working upon developing this technology to suit the nature and reality of the members' activities and equipments.
- o Performing researches and preparing economical feasibility studies for the projects determined to be established and presenting the instructions regarding the contact with Arab and foreign specialized Expertise Houses.
- o Coordinating between member countries in implementing new projects or expanding the existing projects in compliance with the needs of the Arab World, for the purpose of attaining integration between the countries, members of the federation, and making use of non-functioning capacities.
- o Solving technical and commercial problems, etc,which members encounter while performing works, assigned to them.
- o Providing members' needs of materials, numbers and utilities, when necessary or beneficiary.In that case, it is stipulated to provide these needs according to suitable quality and price standards.The Federation urges its members to exchange materials and equipments – when necessary – among each other.

- Urging companies and associations affiliated to the Federation to act as one group in their relationship with other entities,and offering them its support in this field.
- Performing the arbitrator role when resorted to for this purpose or participating in other arbitration works, when requested to do so.
- Encouraging members to establish Arab joint companies and presenting projects for establishing these companies to the Arab Economic Unity Council and Arab Industrial Development and Mining Organization or the Arab competent organization to consider their endorsement.
- Establishing close collaboration relationships with other Arab federations and authorities to achieve the objectives which the federation is striving to attain and establishing cooperation relationships with foreign authorities in relation with the federation work field and its activities.
- Setting a training and habilitation program to raise the efficiency of workers in the federation work field and presenting support and assistance in implementing these programs.
- Issuing the publications, magazines and periodicals and holding seminars for the purpose of achieving the federation's objectives and targets.
- Participating in Arab and International Seminars and Conferences, if their subjects were related to the federation work and members' activities.
- Providing the latest Arab International technical, economical and commercial statistics and information with regards to production materials and utilities and medieval material and final products.
- Offering assistance to the members in providing their needs of technical and administrative cadres through exchange among each other.

Introduction

- Arab Sea Ports Federation is one of the Arab Specialized Federations, working in the Arab League range (The Council of Arab Economic Unity)

- The Federation was established in October 1976, whose headquarter is in Alexandria City – Arab Republic of Egypt. It was established for the purpose of reinforcing the development of Arab Maritime Ports.
- The Federation is a legal entity and has a full legal authorization to practice its works and achieve its goals. It also enjoys administrative and financial independence.
- The Federation's headquarter, branches and offices enjoy immunities stated in the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the Arab Economic Unity Council and what is agreed upon with the country where the Federation's headquarter is located.

Significant Events Important Events in the Federation's History:

- On 24/4/1997, in the meeting of the General Assembly, it has been decided to transfer the headquarter of the Arab Sea Ports Federation to Alexandria City, Arab Republic of Egypt, to be a permanent headquarter of the Federation to give it the pertinent efficiency to practice its activity.
- In November (22-25), 1999, in Abu Dhabi, the Federation Board of Directors approved the Federation flag and shield to be in the shape of: a green rectangular with the authenticated federation logo in white.
- In its meeting, dated May (8-11), 2000 in Tunisia, the Federation Board of Directors decided to approve the acceptance of the companies, practicing various port services and working in Arab maritime ports, in the membership of the Federation.
- In November (5-7), 2001, in Casablanca, Morocco, a celebration was held in the occasion of the passage of a quarter of a century on establishing the Federation, in the course of the events of the 24th regular meeting of the Federation Board of Directors.
- In May 1, 2002, the first issue of the Federation magazine was published "Arab Sea Ports", which was supervised by Promedia Company in Tunisia.
- In 26/2/2003, in its 71st session, the Social and Economic Council indorsed the study of unifying the charts of identifying the tariffs and fees of Arab seaports, which the Arab Sea Ports Federation participated in its preparation.
- In its 30th session, in April (16-17), 2003, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Executive Office of the Arab Transport Ministers endorsed the strategy of upgrading human resources in Arab Sea Ports, prepared by the Arab Sea Ports Federation.
- In January 2004, the second issue of the Ports Federation magazine, which is published by the International Press and Declaration Company in Tunisia, was published.
- In August 2003, Rear Admiral/ Ahmed El-Said Hemieda, the former secretary-general of the federation, who operated the Secretariat-General of the Federation since 24/4/1997, has died.
- In 26/10/2003, in its 16th session, the Arab Transport Premiership has decided to assign the secretary of the technical committee of Maritime Transport to the Arab Sea Ports Federation.
- In January (13-15), 2004, Rear Admiral/ Essam EL-Din Badawy, was assigned to hold the position of the Federation Secretary-General starting from January

1, 2004, upon his nomination by The Arab Republic of Egypt, in the 28th regular meeting of the Federation Board of Directors in Alexandria.

- The Federation membership certificate was distributed among the members of the Federation Board of Directors, which was issued upon Decision no. (2/2002) of the Federation Board of Directors in its 28th regular meeting in Alexandria.
- In 26th of April 2004,the Federation Secretariat- General headquarters was transferred to its new location in 4 Ptolemy Street – Alexandria – Arab Republic of Egypt.

العمل العربي المشترك كأحد أولويات الجامعة العربية

بين النجاح والفشل (1990-2010)

إعداد

ليلى اللوزي

المشرف

الدكتور عمر الحضرمي

ملخص

هذه الرسالة تبحث في تحليل الأداء الحالي لأول مؤسسة إقليمية في المنطقة العربية, ألا وهي الجامعة العربية. وتطمح في الوقت نفسه إلى الوقوف على الأسباب والعوامل الكامنة خلف هذا الأداء بالإعتماد على ثلاث مناهج للتقييم.

وإضافة إلى ذلك, هدفت هذه الدراسة إلى تقييم المساهمات التي أضافتها المؤسسات التابعة للجامعة العربية والمنبثقة عنها إلى العمل العربي المشترك, وبالتالي إيجاد أساس متين ليس فقط لتقييم إنجازات أولى المؤسسات الإقليمية في المنطقة بل لتوجيه عملية الإصلاح الداخلي التي تتطلبها آلية العمل في الجامعة بشكل عاجل لزيادة فاعليتها في إيجاد وخلق مبادرات العمل العربي المشترك.

ولتحقيق أغراض هذه الدراسة التي طرحت أسئلة لا بد منها لإنجاح محاولات تطوير الجامعة, تم اللجوء إلى بحوث نوعية من خلال الإطلاع والبحث في المراجع والأعمال السابقة المقدمة في هذا المجال وإستعراض أمثلة سابقة للأسلوب المتبع من قبل الجامعة العربية في التعامل مع العمل العربي المشترك وإطلاق مبادراته.

وكنتيجة لذلك, وبعد إستعراض نطاق واسع من الخطط غير المطبقة, والمبادرات غير المنفذة, والقرارات غير المفعلة, تم الخلاص إلى أن الفشل سيطر على الجزء الأكبر من عمل الجامعة العربية وبخاصة في إيجاد قاعدة عمل مشترك بين البلدان العربية, وهو ما خلصت إليه هذه الدراسة التي اقترحت المنهج الذي تراه مناسبا لبدء توقع نتائج عمل مشترك في المنطقة العربية.